Much hangs on how China responds to Abe's WWII stance
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Fears are rising that the fragile truce could be short-lived if Japanese pm fails to apologise
Sino-Japanese relations are in a better shape now. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have met twice in six months. Political and security dialogue between high-level officials has also resumed.
It is a marked improvement after two years of turbulence since simmering tensions over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea flared up from late 2012.
But fears are rising that the fragile truce could be short-lived and could end come August 15, if China is not pleased with a statement that Abe is to make on his country's role in World War II that ended 70 years ago.
Most analysts are already predicting that China will be disappointed in its hopes of an apology from Abe on Japan's wartime actions, given how he has not done so during his two speeches last month, one to a joint session of the United States Congress and the other at the Asian-African Conference in Indonesia.
A barrage of angry editorials and commentaries in Chinese state media slamming Abe’s lack of apology in his two speeches underscores the great importance China places on what he is going to say and do on August 15.
It also raises questions on how China might react should the Japanese leader show insufficient remorse in his statement.
As a country that suffered some of the worst atrocities of Japanese aggression, from the Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s to the end of WWII in 1945, China is justified in feeling that the 70th anniversary is an appropriate occasion for the current Japanese government to apologise again for its wartime actions in China.
These include the 1937 Nanking Massacre that is believed to have killed 300,000 Chinese.
“There is a psychological factor because of the 70th anniversary. In normal years, there isn’t much emphasis on getting an apology. But this year, we hope even more to see an appropriate response from Japan,” said Renmin University foreign policy analyst Jin Canrong.
In China’s eyes, an apology is also deemed more pressing and significant now in the light of Abe’s well-documented revisionist attitude towards history, including his reluctance to acknowledge the use of Chinese and Korean women as sex slaves for Japanese troops during the war.
“For China, Abe’s choice of words is a serious indicator of his attitude on the historical issue. If Abe expresses only remorse and not an apology, China will regard it as a signal that Abe is planning to revise the historical issue,” said Singapore-based analyst Li Mingjiang of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
However, from a strategic viewpoint, it may not be in China’s interests to continue to publicly press Abe for an apology, or appear too ready to retaliate and cool off warming ties if he does not strike the right tone in his August 15 statement.
First, China could exude a semblance of class by not showing that it is too hard up for an apology. After all, there is a Chinese saying – gong dao zi zai ren xin – which loosely translates as people having a sense of natural justice.
This means the public will judge for themselves whether the Japanese government has shown enough remorse for the country’s past actions.
Also, while China insists that its demand for an apology stems from a desire to uphold historical justice, there are those who believe there are political motives behind this call. Its high-profile criticisms of Abe and his government can only fuel such a belief.
For instance, some say China is pressuring Japan in order to fan popular support for the Communist Party, whose major source of legitimacy is its role in fighting the Japanese invaders in the 1930s-1940s.
Another oft-cited reason is that it wants to sway international opinion against Japan, that an unrepentant Japan cannot be trusted to play a bigger global role, something Tokyo desires.
While several past Japanese leaders had apologised for their country’s wartime atrocities, there is a sense among the Chinese that these were not sincere enough, particularly as some continued to pay their respects to the war dead, including WWII criminals, at the Yasukuni shrine.
Still, Chinese leaders have hailed the apology of then prime minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995 as one which other leaders such as Abe could follow.
Should Abe strike the right tone in August, then China should show the magnanimity befitting an aspiring superpower by agreeing to bury the hatchet with Japan permanently.
For while the apology is important, China should be more concerned about Abe’s actions as prime minister.
Abe is widely regarded as a nationalist who is loath to live under the shadow of China and longs to revive the glory days of his country as a dominant Asian power.
To this end, he is believed to be trying to revise Japan’s post-war pacifist Constitution that restricts its military to self-defence, to give it a wider role. However, on this, he has been facing resistance from the public as well as the opposition.
China’s strong demand for an apology, and threats of retaliatory measures should there not be one, could inadvertently fuel fears of a “China threat” among the Japanese and weaken resistance to Abe’s push to revise the Constitution. This could hurt China’s long-term strategic interests.
On the other hand, if China were seen to be prioritising regional stability over pride by showing restraint in the event that the Abe government does not act according to its desire, international public opinion towards Beijing would probably be favourable.
Asking China to moderate its reaction to Abe if he should fail to apologise might appear to belittle the wartime pain and suffering of the Chinese. But such a restrained approach and response might advance the country’s future interests more than otherwise.
