2015 is Prayut’s year, for better or for worse

Truth is, even with the help of the machine guns and tanks, anybody else in his place would have faded away (General Suchinda Kraprayoon comes to mind) or morphed into something unthinkable (General Sonthi Boonyaratglin is a great example) by now. This doesn’t mean Prayut will not go down one of the same roads eventually, but there’s something about him that suggests a stronger immunity compared to the other two coup leaders. This is where his other power comes in – the odd charm that still maintains its hold on supporters, and the lingering doubts (in some cases blatant fears) concerning the so-called flag-bearers of Thai democracy.

Last year, my Person of the Year was, abstractly, Mr “Now You See Me”, referring to the elusive, so-near-yet-so-far political reform that everyone was talking about. My choice this year is more traditional. 

For overseeing a reform process that hit countless suspicious snags and yet managing to inspire a degree of faith in his words; for surviving immense pressure, not least from Western governments; and for manoeuvring his way to a crossroads that ties his future firmly to that of Thailand, for better or worse, General Prayut Chan-o-cha is my 2015 Person of the Year.

Like any product of the Thai political strife, Prayut means different things to different people. Some regard him as a “hero” but others can’t wait to see the back of this “villain”. But whether he’s someone making great sacrifices for his beloved country, or a cunning opportunist, or a clueless opportunist, or an out-and-out dictator, he is making a great impact on the nation. The next election will either snub him or yield results he advocates. Whatever transpires, it will be Thailand reacting to his intervention.

The reaction can be either positive or negative, thankful or furious. And it could come thick and fast in 2016. Prayut ended 2015 without suffering any devastating blow but he has not yet defused a major time-bomb: The Rajabhakti Park controversy is fast becoming a scandal, which could mock his stance against corruption and boost opponents’ claims that “democratic graft” was at least better than a “dictatorial” one. Before Rajabhakti, Prayut survived a human rights barrage highlighting the plight of foreign refugees.

The Erawan Shrine explosions that happened under his watch got Thailand some global sympathy, but another major defining moment was a lot less dramatic, tumultuous and chaotic. In fact, the terrorist bombings almost completely overshadowed the military-installed legislature’s rejection of a constitutional reform blueprint worked out by another set of military appointees. One excuse for the constitutional anti-climax was that Thailand was not yet ready for a democratic election, but such an excuse is closely associated with how much longer Prayut would stay in power.

From the first gong of 2016, the prime minister will come out of his corner to an immediate onslaught. The trial of Yingluck Shinawatra in connection with allegedly massive graft in the rice-pledging scheme is supposed to reach its climax, and how the already explosive issue will be made more inflammable by the Rajabhakti Park case remains to be seen. The new process of charter drafting will also reach its crunch stage. Unfriendly Western governments will continue to be hostile. No economic miracle can be expected. All these can combine to make 2015 feel like a walk in the park.

Students don’t like him, but their parents probably do. City people may not stage an uprising against him but they are unlikely to go out of their way to help him, either. Moreover, the effects of the political divide can be compounded by the fact that he will have been a full-blown incumbent in 2016, a status extremely awkward for even a democratically elected leader. For Prayut, the New Year can be a time when hatred peaks and admiration becomes undermined by doubts. But whatever happens to him will also greatly affect Thailand’s national course. His future has intertwined with that of Thailand’s, and this is as much as the opposing camps in the Thai political divide can agree on.

It seems like while 2015 was pretty much under his control, 2016 will be different. Prayut’s “other power” – the considerable public affection that Suchinda and Sonthi didn’t have – got him through the year but the situation will be treacherous in the coming one. In the end, Prayut will do what Prayut wants to do, but he will be ill-advised to underestimate the ebb and flow of this “other power”, which has taught many leaders before him, democratic or otherwise, painful lessons.