A unique display of political will between US, Asean

Even with such a longstanding engagement, Asean was still very cautious when it came to joint statements. The first draft proposed by the US was titled majestically as the Sunnylands Principle, which was finally shot down by Indonesia - stressing that the word “principle” was far too big and committed for a first special summit.
Some other Asean members had differing views on the level of binding forces between “declaration” and “principle.” However, after lengthy discussion, both Asean and the US decided to support Indonesia’s lead.
These principles were meant to provide the most comprehensive framework for strategic and security cooperation between Asean and the US known to date. The language used and content agreed on was clear, displaying strong political will, as never seen before in previous joint statements since their leaders held the first leaders’ meeting in 2009.
Judging from the resulting document, Asean managed to add its own often cited elements and principles from all its sources, adhering to “a rule-based regional and international order which upholds and protects the rights and privileges of all states”.
Three key principles — numbers 1, 5 and 7 – were pivotal to Asean. The first dealt with “mutual respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality and political independence of all nations by firmly upholding principles and purposes of the UN Charter, the Asean Charter and international law.”
“Political independence” is a new element in Asean-US relations which obviously referred to the grouping’s diverse political systems. Obama’s encompassing invitation to all Asean leaders for the meeting was indicative of American political expediency. In the past, political differences posed barriers for closer ties — not so much today.
Principle No 5 specifically endorsed Asean centrality by the US, which pledged “respect and support for Asean centrality and Asean-led mechanisms in the evolving regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific”.
In the past, the US used milder words such as “reaffirm” and “dedicate” for its support of Asean’s leading role in an emerging regional security structure. After the US elevation to be the group’s seventh strategic partner in November, the White House has used stronger language in recognising Asean as a collective force to be reckoned with. Under the Obama administration, especially in the second term, Asean has effectively been transformed to a key strategic platform in the region to engage the rise of China.
A few American scholars view the latest US position negatively. One commented that “it is delusional to portray Asean [as having] more than a marginal role in the regional political/security order.” While others thought that Asean centrality was just rhetoric and the group too weak to counter China’s growing assertiveness.
The No 7 principle was the most controversial. It is aimed at the ongoing conflict in the South China Sea and the current state of power plays. The negotiation focused on whether to add the current arbitration effort and the formulation of a code of conduct in the declaration as sought by the Philippines and supported by Vietnam.
In January 2013, the Philippines decided to submit for arbitration China’s claim to the disputed areas in the South China Sea. Manila proceeded without any consultation with Asean for fear it would not garner any consensus. At Sunnylands, their disagreements resurfaced. Towards the end, the US suggested a neutral phrase that simply said “full respect for legal and diplomatic process.”
Asean has been extremely careful to avoid any public perception that the US-Asean special summit was a show of solidarity vis-a-vis China’s growing military might, or for that matter other major powers. The declaration does not contain any word or term that would associate with China.
At its own meetings, Asean has been more vocal. At last week’s Asean foreign ministers’ retreat in Vientiane, Foreign Minister Thongloun Sisoulith said Asean leaders expressed serious concern over recent and ongoing developments in the South China Sea. He said Asean took note of concerns expressed by some ministers on land reclamation and escalating activities which had eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions, and might undermine peace, security and regional stability.
Now that the US has become more pragmatic and resilient in engaging Asean as a group, it has unwittingly set an example for emulation by Russia and China, whose leaders will hold summits with the Asean leaders in May and September respectively.
Certainly, declarations planned for the commemorative summits between Russia-Asean, plus China and Asean will contain similar facets found in the Sunnylands Declaration, especially those related to rule-based security orders.  Some differences can be expected.
Unlike the US, both Russia and China have submitted their initiatives related to regional security architecture for consideration by Asean. In early 2013, Moscow submitted a Declaration on the Framework Principles of Strengthening Security and Developing Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. In the same year, China also put forward its proposed Treaty for Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation. In this connection, India and Indonesia also submitted security proposals for vetting by Asean. Although two workshops have been held to discuss these initiatives, there has been little progress in coming up with common visions.
The Russian and Chinese initiatives want to establish a new regional security order based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. They also contain not only familiar regional and international security guidelines and codes of conduct, but also offer ambitious ideas that resonate with Asean values and norms. Their common objective is to promote the idea that security in the region is indivisible and efforts to strengthen one’s security must not be done at the expense of others – in other words, non-alliance security cooperation.
It remains to be seen how Asean will respond to Russian and Chinese strategic thinking during the summits and their resulting documents.