As 2026 approaches, the general election is set to take place on schedule, in line with Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s pledge. At the latest, the poll will be held by early April next year, in accordance with the memorandum of agreement between the Bhumjaithai-led government and the People’s Party.
In the run-up to the ballot, the trajectories of the main political parties are already beginning to emerge.
For Pheu Thai, the turmoil is severe. The party has suffered its most dramatic shift yet, falling hard after being unseated from power. Paetongtarn Shinawatra lost the premiership in the wake of the Hun Sen video scandal, while Thaksin Shinawatra was sent back behind bars. Party momentum has collapsed, culminating in defeat in the Sisaket by-election, a contest that was meant to mark Pheu Thai’s comeback but instead deepened its decline.
Insiders whisper that more than 30 Pheu Thai MPs are already looking for escape routes, preparing to part ways with their political patriarch once his aura of invincibility fades.
The resignation of Chuwit Pitakpornpallop from Pheu Thai membership was another sign of the exodus. Although not an MP himself, his daughter, Sudarat Pitakpornpallop, is the Pheu Thai MP for Ubon Ratchathani. Chuwit’s defection underscores that a major haemorrhage may be underway. His new political home is the Kla Tham Party, where he is set to make his debut as adviser to Deputy Prime Minister and Agriculture Minister Thammanat Prompao.
Another Ubon heavyweight under scrutiny is Kriang Kalptinan, former deputy interior minister and long-time Thaksin ally. He, too, may be weighing his future, whether to stay with Pheu Thai or shift to a new camp such as Kla Tham.
Across the Northeast and several central provinces, the season of political realignment is visibly intensifying. Bhumjaithai and Kla Tham appear to be the two most attractive destinations for migrating politicians. The South is no exception, where both camps are moving aggressively to expand their strategic footholds.
In Songkhla, political manoeuvring over candidate line-ups is reaching fever pitch. The name of Dech-it Khaothong, MP for Songkhla Constituency 5 from the Democrat Party, is at the centre of a potential deal with the Kla Tham Party. However, obstacles remain, notably fierce resistance from Chonnaphat Naksue, MP for Constituency 4, who has long been at odds with Dech-it.
Chonnaphat has bluntly told party leaders: “If he’s in, I’m out.” His condition is clear: if Dech-it joins Kla Tham, he will defect to Bhumjaithai. Another figure directly affected by any move by Dech-it’s group is Anukool Pruksanusak, former deputy government spokesman, who is determined to reclaim Constituency 6 from Supaporn Kamnertphol, Dech-it’s wife, who had previously beaten him.
Observers say Kla Tham may ultimately manage Songkhla’s political landscape smoothly, with a high chance of securing Dech-it, who could then bring along his wife (Constituency 6), his son Saksit Khaothong (Constituency 9), and Surin Palare (Constituency 8).
Another ex-Democrat, Sirichok Sopha, known for his close ties to former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, is also said to have closed a deal with Kla Tham. Sirichok is expected to contest Constituency 7 under Kla Tham colours, challenging Natchanon Srikokua of the “blue camp.” This raises questions over whether Abhisit will ever return to rescue the Democrats.
Other Songkhla MPs are also on the move. Somyos Plaiduang (Constituency 3) is expected to join Bhumjaithai, along with Sastra Sripan (Constituency 2) of the United Thai Nation Party. In Constituency 1, Democrat MP Sanphet Boonyamanee, son of Nipon Boonyamanee, may be biding his time. If certain figures return to shore up the Democrats, he may stay; if not, the blue camp appears ready to welcome him.
All this comes as the government enjoys its honeymoon phase, basking in political calm. Yet the VVIP backers who helped bring it to power are said to be eyeing the real power brokers in the “blue camp” with unease. Because they have begun to feel uneasy about the behind-the-scenes management of positions and personnel, as well as the questionable “business model” of politics cloaked in nationalism, a model that, having tried to escape the shadow of Thaksin, has instead collided with the so-called Buri Ram model.
Whether the Bhumjaithai-led government can sustain its grip on power amid these unconventional deals remains to be seen. The answers may come sooner rather than later.