Govt clueless on how to deal with South
The strife-torn Southern provinces have always been an enigma in the modern history of Thailand and will likely remain a serious security threat for decades to come.
The security prognosis is grim because the Yingluck Shinawatra government appears clueless on how to rein in the insurgency.
Every time a bomb goes off, the government reacts with a fire-fighter mentality by trying to put out a fire until the public’s attention moves on to other news. Since the resumption of violence in 2004, the insurgents seem to have become more and more sophisticated in their attacks, while the authorities have been busy trying to figure out the violence instead of quelling it.
The security in the four Southern border provinces is not going to improve and may become worse unless the government comes to terms with five crucial factors.
_ Stop feeding false expectations about peace.
The government leaders are sending the wrong signal by casting the ongoing insurgency as a temporary abnormality. For almost a century, the region has been mired in violence with occasional brief interludes of peace.
Before the authorities can engage the insurgents in talks on disarmament, peace is elusive and a realistic goal is to contain the violence.
_ Act on a political solution instead of talking about it.
If there is going to be a glimmer of hope for lasting peace, then the government must convince the insurgents to lay down their arms. In the history of modern warfare, there is no success story of crushing an insurgency movement by military means.
Politicians in the pro-Thaksin camp should have no difficulty contacting the insurgents, even thoughseveral insurgent leaders have actually turned their backs on allies of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Figures like Spa-ing Baso and Masae Useng were prominent in local politics and worked in cahoots with Thaksin’s allies before leading the insurgency.
_ PM Yingluck must opt for civilian measures instead of depending on the military.
Make no mistake about it, soldiers are patriots doing their best to keep the country from being torn asunder. But they are trained to map out and implement a military strategy, which has nothing to do with rooting out the cause fuelling the insurgency.
To her credit, Yingluck stalled for almost a year before endorsing the military-initiated restructure in dealing with the strife-torn region. But she had to cave in after the surge of violence last month simply because she had no alternative at hand.
Although the prime minister had slightly modified the original proposal, the formation of the steering committee led by Deputy Prime Minister Yuthasak Sasiprapha still implied that the military would be lurking in the shadows to influence all measures pertaining to the region.
The steering committee is a political body, but its work is being ruined by the military-dominated Internal Security Operation Command.
_ Restructuring has proven futile.
When he was in power, Thaksin implemented dozens of restructuring plans involving soldiers, police and civilians, but all his efforts were in vain. Yingluck should have learned from her brother’s experience.
The government should think hard on how to deal with the insurgency instead of toying with the bureaucracy, which will only lead to treacherous fighting among the bureaucrats.
_ Start to reduce the military presence and let the locals work to ensure their security.
The soldiers should be deployed as a short-term measure to check the surge of violence. But the long-term presence of the military could adversely become fodder for the insurgency. The government should emulate the counterinsurgency experiences of the United Kingdom and China.
