FRIDAY, March 29, 2024
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Ethiopia says Boeing pilot training for 737 Max was inadequate

Ethiopia says Boeing pilot training for 737 Max was inadequate

Boeing training recommendations were inadequate for Ethiopian Airlines pilots switching to the Max jet from older 737 models before a deadly crash a year ago, according to a new report on the incident.

More simulator sessions will be needed to familiarize aviators with a safety feature known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, Ethiopian investigators wrote in a 136-page report, released by country's ministry of transport on Monday. The MCAS was central to the reasons why a Boeing 737 Max plane operated by Ethiopian Airlines crashed into a field near Addis Ababa on March 10 last year, killing all 157 people on board.

The Max was grounded by regulators around the world days after the accident, which followed a similarly deadly crash in Indonesia five months earlier. Work to redesign the MCAS software and to address additional safety issues still isn't complete and the U.S. manufacturer doesn't expect the its top-selling jet to return until summer at the earliest.

In both the Ethiopian Airlines incident and a Lion Air plane crash in October 2018, the Max jets were hit by a malfunction that triggered repeated, automated attempts to dive the plane. It was possible for the pilots to counteract the problem, but they became confused and were eventually overwhelmed, according to earlier reports.

Helping explain what the aviators were doing is key for investigators, yet the new report from Ethiopia's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau doesn't address the pilots' behavior. The conclusions focus on Boeing, including issues with MCAS and the angle-of-attack software used during takeoff.

Training requirements for the 737 Max were set by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and Ethiopian authorities. Boeing had insisted that the Max was so similar to earlier models that only limited training was needed to move from one to the other, and made that a selling point for the plane.

While the underlying MCAS failure occurred in both crashes, there are also significant differences between the two incidents. Notably, the actions by the pilots varied significantly, according to available data from both investigations.

On the Ethiopian flight, a wind vane-like sensor on the left side of the plane, designed to show whether its nose was pointed above or below the oncoming wind, failed on takeoff. That caused a string of alarms, creating a disorientating environment of loud warnings and disagreeing instruments.

Then, about 80 seconds after liftoff, MCAS activated, pushing the nose down for nine seconds. It reactivated a short time later, leaving the plane difficult to control.

The pilots responded by shutting off power to the motor commanding the dive -- as recommended to pilots by Boeing after the first crash. But they apparently switched it back on, which prompted MCAS to activate again and led to the final dive.

Further actions made the situation worse and the plane became difficult to control.

Most notably, the crew left their engines set at takeoff power, which caused the plane to fly far faster than its design limit. At least for portions of the flight, the pilots also had the ability to counteract MCAS with switches on their control columns. Yet they never brought the plane back to a normal configuration.

 

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