Disunity puts southern peace process on its last legs

It's an open secret that a small group of people at the National Security council (NSC) has been talking to a group from the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo), under the leadership of Kasturi Mahkota and Noor Abdulrahman. According to a statement on their website, they claim to have teamed up with another long standing separatist group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C).

The problem is that, in spite of years of talks, the NSC has not been able to convince civilian leaders to give the process the full mandate that would guarantee continuity regardless of changes in the government.

Another problem with this NSC-backed process is that there are other separatist leaders and groups who call themselves Pulo and BRN-C. All are competing amongst themselves to be recognised internationally as the sole spokesman for the Malays of Patani.

And then there is the Army, which has never liked the idea of an NSC-led process but, nevertheless, appointed one of their men to the process anyway. They didn't like it because they weren't leading the process.

"The NSC can't guarantee continuity. We have the keys to the deep South," said one senior military official.

No one doubts that these self-proclaimed separatist leaders fought against the Thai military at the height of the armed struggle in the 1970s and 1980s. But today, it's a different reality. A new generation of Malay-Muslim insurgents are on the ground, organised in cells that are scattered through the entire Malay-speaking South. Few, if any, identify themselves with the long-standing groups. Their leaders have regular dialogue with the old guard but this does not constitute a shared command.

The juwae, as they are known, don't seem to have a real exit strategy except to depend on the old guard. Even then, they don't seem to be in a hurry to solidify the link.

The problem with the old guard is that they are extremely territorial and competitive. All insist that they are the "real deal". Apparently, there are a lot of "real deals" - enough out there to give local think tanks and international NGOs, as well as international organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), a run for their money. And like the leaders of the long-standing separatist groups, these so-called mediators or facilitators are just as territorial.

The OIC, since mid last year, has initiated a few rounds of meetings with the exiled leaders and urged them to set up an umbrella organisation and call it the United Patani People's Council (UPPC). The problem with this idea is that the leaders tried it before, two decades ago, but Bersatu, as it was called, didn't evolve into anything meaningful because none of the groups were willing to make any real concessions for the greater good.

Besides, said a member of the now defunct Bersatu, "If the Thai government doesn't want anything to do with the UPPC, then there isn't much the OIC can do about it."

Nevertheless, no one is waiting for a green light from Bangkok. Participants at OIC functions said Sweden-based Rushdee Yingor, also a Pulo leader but from a different faction from Kasturi's, is said to the potential flag-bearer for the UPPC if and when it gets off the ground.

Not far from Rushdee is Samsudine Khan, also a self-proclaimed Pulo leader. Khan has some connections with OIC leaders but no one seems to know if this link will help him achieve prominence in the exiled community.

Another headache for the exiled leaders is that none of them have been able to convince the international community beyond a reasonable doubt that they have enough clout and influence to command and control the thousands of young Malay-Muslim militants on the ground.

Nevertheless, many are convinced, including some in the Thai Army, that talking to the old guard is the only way to go, simply because the juwae will not surface for direct talks, for fear that they will be killed should the talks break down.

Today, with the NSC-backed process on its last legs, the Army is at the drawing board debating how to kick-start a peace process of its own. The top brass has said they are willing to work with neighbouring countries, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, to get them to facilitate talks with the old guard in the hope that they will talk sense into the juwae.

That's easier said than done, however, given the fact that more and more juwae, especially the young ones, are not as enthusiastic about the idea of talking peace. Some are busy selling their services to drug-traffickers and smugglers, while others think the whole idea of peace is just a ploy to get them to surface so they can be liquidated.

A few months ago, the Army and police were reading from separate sheets of music as they explained to the public the series of car bombs in downtown Yala. Police blamed the insurgents while the Army said it was smugglers.

But in the aftermath of the blitz in Narathiwat's Sungai Kolok last Friday that involved two motorbike bombs and one car bomb, the Army and police are singing the same tune - young militants selling their services to crime syndicates with an axe to grind with the security forces for cracking down on them.

A BRN-C cadre, who is not affiliated with Kasturi's network, said his outfit is very concerned with the fact that some of the young juwae are working for criminal gangs. The criminalisation of the movement will undermine the long-term objective and, in the short term, be a source of embarrassment for the movement when asked why they are unable to control the young men on the ground.

The same BRN-C cadre confirmed the authorities' claims and added that the "elders are extremely concerned with such activities, as it blurs the line between insurgency and criminality."

From the movement's perspective, said the source, such a trend falls into the trap of the Yingluck government, whose aim is to demonise the armed struggle and downplay the historical grievances of the Malays of Patani.

From the perspective of the Yingluck administration, armed separatists with historical grievances and drug-traffickers with lots of methamphetamines are more or less in the same boat of wrongdoers. And with such attitude, it is not hard to imagine where the administration's stand on the so-called "peace dialogue" is going.

That leaves the Army. Can the top brass pull off a trick and work with Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta which, from their perspective, are not exactly "honest brokers" but stakeholders? The fact that many of the old guard live there and carry their respective citizenships makes it hard for the Thai side to see the two countries as neutral.

Nevertheless, there is an understanding that withoutsome kind of facilitation from Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, bringing everybody to the same table will be extremely difficult. But even if that can be done, there is no guarantee the juwae would endorse any of it.

For any peace process to survive, it will have to come up with something extremely attractive to get the attention of the juawae, who see themselves as winning because they can hit just about any place at any time in this restive region.