Once again, no lesson learned in Afghanistan

The world has seen it coming for some time, but the recent agreement at the Nato summit in Chicago puts the final seal on the decision by multi-national forces that the full withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan is in the offing. This in spite of military intervention achieving an outcome much less desirable than what was anticipated a decade ago.

If anything, the summit was a testimony to the fact that the troop surge of 2010 made little difference in terms of changing the course of the conflict. The Taleban has demonstrated once again that it can withstand whatever the US-led forces are able to throw at it, and now the rebels know the exact date of the withdrawal of the foreign enemy.

Like it or not, Afghanistan is not going to be a model of Western-style democracy as once envisioned by the international community. The lack of solid institutions and rampant corruption at all levels mean the country still has a long way to go before it can achieve anything even resembling a genuine democracy.

Some say democracy is a process of change. But change for the better has not come quick enough for many Afghans, who are still waiting for their government to deliver on much-needed basic goods and services.

For the US-led coalition forces, the lesson of Afghanistan has been clear: toppling an undesirable government is easy, but building a good one in its place is not. Perhaps the West should not have got itself into the business of nation-building in Afghanistan and should have let the warlords work it out themselves after the Taleban and their al-Qaeda friends were initially driven out.

Perhaps it was the historical guilt of abandoning Afghanistan after Soviet troops pulled out in 1989. But let’s not get romantic about that episode. It was the Afghan warlords who turned the guns on each other after the Russians left. In many ways, it was their own internal bickering that paved the way for the entrance of the fanatical Taleban.

For a while – at least until the US-led forces pushed the Taleban out of the capital Kabul in late 2001 – the warlords managed to form an alliance among themselves. Their cooperation was strictly for military purposes, to fight the Taleban, and had nothing to do with nation-state building.

Lip service was paid to the notions of democracy and human rights after the US-led forces drove the Taleban out of power and into the rugged Pakistan borderlands, where they have remained. But a decade has passed and the Afghans still have little to show in terms of progress. Stories coming out of the country tend to centre on corruption and how ill prepared the country’s security forces are for the inevitable conflict ahead.

Making the situation even more difficult is the waxing and waning relationship between the US and Pakistan. Of late, the argument between the two has centred on the six-month blockade of the Afghanistan-bound supply route that was closed down after US air strikes mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in November 2011.

Nato had invited Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari to the Chicago summit, hoping for a breakthrough on this sticky issue. Instead, Islamabad is demanding an increase in transit charges from US$250 to as much as $5,000 per vehicle.

Officially, the two countries are still negotiating this fee. But it is also apparent that America’s patience with Pakistan is running low. Not accepting the deal could give Zardari some breathing space from the opposition, which has turned against the US. But then again, his cash-strapped government needs all the help it can get, especially in the area of counter-terrorism.

The international community needs to continue working closely with Pakistan to ensure that Afghanistan will not revert to being a playground for foreign fanatics and terrorists. But Pakistan should also work harder to stay relevant, especially after the US and international forces pull out of Afghanistan. But with its current attitude, Pakistan risks being sidelined and isolated, not being part of any process.