Good intentions are not enough in the deep South

What’s the trade off?

According to sources, in exchange for the SBPAC coming under the directive of Isoc, the Thaksin Shinawatra camp would be given a free hand to carry out peace talks with the various Malay-Muslim separatist movements.

“This is a major appeasement made by the government that allows the Army to have control over operations in the three restive border provinces,” said Sunai Phasuk of Human Rights Watch. 

It is also clear that, under this arrangement, Deputy Prime Minister Yuthasak Sasriprapa’s role in the newly established southern command centre will be largely symbolic.

Yuthasak has recently announced that the govenrment will be engaging in peace talks with the Malay-Muslim insurgents but insisted that the dialogue will not constitute a formal negotiation.

For decades, the Army has had a monopoly over dealing with the armed separatist groups. But since the post-coup, interim government led by Surayud Chulanont, civilians have been brought into the process. The National Security Council (NSC) was given the task, and the process more or less continued until the Democrat government of Abhisit Vejjajiva. But the current government of Yingluck Shinawatra has handed the mandate to Thawee Sodsong, the current SBPAC chief, who happens to be one of the ruling Pheu Thai Party’s favourite bureaucrats.

The mastermind behind this latest round of horse-trading is no other than Thaksin himself, the Pheu Thai Party’s de factor leader. Thaksin was never fond of the SBPAC to begin with. He dissolved the agency in 2002 because he thought his Wadah politicians were capable enough of overseeing the Malay-speaking South. 

Wadah lost all their clout in the three southernmost provinces after the Tak Bai massacre in October 2004, and the Thaksin camp, and any politicians associated with him, never recovered since. 

And so when his sister Yingluck came into power a year ago, Thaksin thought about dissolving the centre once again. But with the legislative backing established during the Abshisit government, dissolving the SBPAC would not be so easy. And so Pheu Thai sent Thawee to oversee the agency.

Besides being the SBPAC chief, Thawee was also given the additional task of negotiating with the separatists, which he treated as a preparation move for a meeting with Thaksin and some separatist leaders, which took place in March this year. The Malaysian government, namely the Special Branch, was asked to facilitate the meeting between Thaksin and a group of separatist leaders, the same people who had been meeting with the Thai military three decades ago. 

Because Thawee overlooked the fact that there is a generation and trust gap within the separatist movement – as well as the absence of adequate command-and-control links between these old-guard leaders and the current generation of militants operating on the ground – his effort proved to be fruitless. 

Since late last year, at a time when Thawee’s secret process was going full steam ahead, insurgents have stepped up the level of violence by carrying out some bold and daring attacks that have not only raised eyebrows but heightened the psychological impact of the insurgency. These include the March 31 car bombs in Yala and Hat Yai, the “Mayo” operation that was carried out in front of CCTV cameras, the attack on the CS Pattani Hotel, as well as various coordinated attacks at military installations over this past year.

Thawee was hoping that the cash handouts to compensate victims of violence, as well as various development projects doled out by the SBPAC, would generate enough goodwill between him and the locals to have a positive effect upon his dealings with the separatist movements. But historical mistrust between the state and the Malay-speaking South remains unchanged and the insurgents are yet to forget about his past deeds, particularly in the aftermath of the January 2004 arms heist when he was sent down South to chase after the suspects. 

Kasturi Mahkota, who heads one of the factions within the Patani United Liberation Organisation movement (Pulo), maintains that the recent spike in violence is to remind the Thai side that the Tak Bai massacre, which took place during Ramadan in 2004, has not been forgotten or forgiven. 

Needless to say, Thawee rubbed a lot of people up the wrong way, and many, including those in the movement, have yet to forgive him or Thaksin for the massacre. The message from the separatist movement is that good intentions are not enough. There must be genuine commitment from the state, and the Thai side will have to spell out what kind of concessions they are willing to make before the entire movement – old guard and current generation of active militants – will move as one on the idea of peace, according to one BRN-Coordinate operative.