'Religious' protests need to be seen in local contexts

After all, this apparent chain effect is in the same spirit the world saw last year with the Arab Spring. 

While reports and comments from media outlets have taken a religious overtone, reactions in certain pockets and affected communities suggest that the local context should not be overlooked. The texture differs from one place to another, thus making it difficult to generalise the issue. 

Feelings on the ground vary from place to place, and are “rooted in the history of tense theological and political relations between Islam and the West as played out in the Middle Eastern and Western theatres,” says Professor Imtiyaz Yusuf, an Islamic scholar at Assumption University’s Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion in Bangkok.

One reading of the now notorious anti-Islam film “Innocence of Muslims” is that its producer – an Egyptian Coptic Christian living in the US – wanted to create a rift between Christians and Muslims.

But some Muslim leaders, such as Hezbollah’s Hasan Nasralla, with an axe to grind with the US, have called on Muslim demonstrators to direct their protest against Israel and the US. 

Indeed, no Church has been attacked, and the episode is centred on the concept of freedom of speech, which is interpreted differently in the West and the East,” Professor Imtiyaz said.

One of the main questions emanating from the Muslim-majority southernmost provinces of Thailand has been, Why hasn’t Washington gone beyond condemning the film and removed it from cyberspace once and for all? 

Such a question is understandable, as Western-style freedom of speech has little bearing in this particular region, where people are used to a state-constructed narrative and explanation for things controversial. 

The local version of history that sees this Malay-speaking region as a territory occupied by the Siamese, for example, has to be whispered. Many believe that an open debate about the traditional local narrative could land them on somebody's blacklist. 

In the end, regardless of one’s lofty ideals, people everywhere will have to face the practicalities of real politics. But there are those who try hard to link one issue to another, to give weight to something they may be working on. For example, Thai officials have never shied away from using the religious card against militant insurgents without taking into consideration the possible damage that may occur from such a tactic.

The insurgency in Thailand’s Malay-speaking deep South is ethno-nationalist in nature. But instead of addressing the root cause of the problem, many Thai government officials choose to employ the “Islamic terrorist” card to attack separatist insurgents. 

The authorities are not the only ones who take up such a textbook approach. This past week, Muslims and other religious leaders flew to Bangkok to take part in an inter-religious dialogue. Like the Muslim protests around the world, there was a tendency to connect the event to the ongoing insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. 

Professor Imtiyaz suggested that these leaders may be barking up the wrong tree. Because the southern conflict is ethno-nationalist, solutions, said Imtiyaz, have to be centred around the goal of mutual recognition of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. 

“The problem with most inter-faith dialogue activities is that they are ‘goody goody’ events for photo opportunities, where all religious groups say how good their own religions are, when the ground reality is that no religion is free from the stain of violence, physical or non-physical, towards other religious groups,” said Professor Imtiyaz.

“If dialogue does not bring essential change in one’s religious view about other religions, then it is a waste of time. If not conducted objectively, each dialogue partner expects the other to understand without understanding the religion of the other,” he added.

In southern Thailand, successive generations of separatist militants continue to embrace an ethno-nationalist narrative in their campaign against the Thai state. But the Thai authorities continue to employ the religious card in their public relations drive, often posting statements from prominent leaders in and outside the Muslim world. 

Needless to say, these statements have virtually no impact because the militants, as well as the local Muslim population, in this contested region, already know that the conflict is not about religion. 

And while local Muslims may not agree with the brutality and violent methods employed by the insurgents, it is quite clear that they share the same sentiments and historical mistrust of the Thai state. 

During this past Ramadan, for example, Thai authorities tried hard, again, to play up the religious card, trying to connect the slight spike in violence to the Muslim holy month. 

Local Muslim and community leaders point out that the so-called “Ramadan violence” has more to do with the Tak Bai massacre of late 2004, which took place during Ramadan in that year. 

They have warned the authorities against playing the religious card for political gain, saying that such a tactic is a big turnoff to Muslims. Like other warnings, this one has fallen on deaf ears.