Afghan adventure will end with the job half done

The US-led international forces in Afghanistan are set to leave the war-torn country by the end of 2014, but many questions remained unanswered, especially about Kabul’s ability to effectively handle the security of the nation.
The US and Nato have spent nearly US$40 billion to train and equip 350,000 Afghan soldiers and police officers, who will take charge of security and law enforcement once foreign troops leave. The effort was short-changed during the administration of George W Bush, when America’s focus shifted to Iraq.
But even with huge investment in resources under President Barack Obama, only one out of 23 brigades in the Afghan armed forces is able to operate independently, according to a Pentagon report this month. One can only imagine the scenario when air and military support from the US and Nato is gone. And the Afghan armed forces still suffer a 20-per-cent desertion rate, according to a study by the US Congress.
Washington’s plan calls for Afghans to take over all military operations by next June – a mere six months from now. Picking up the pace of preparations will be almost impossible, especially with the Kabul government still light-years away from consolidating control over the country.
The US and its allies took a big leap of faith when they assumed the enormous task of rebuilding this failed state when it was largely under the control of the Taleban and their al-Qaeda allies.
What started off as a military operation to drive the Taleban from power and al-Qaeda out of the country turned out to be a tremendous and costly exercise in building a nation-state.
The West has tried hard to impose a system that is basically alien to this largely tribal society, and has thus learned the hard way, a decade later, that the obstacles are too deep-rooted.
Beside the fact that most of the Afghan military recruits are illiterate, many have to be taught from scratch to serve and fight in a conventional force. The world wrongly assumed that, just because warfare has been common in Afghan history, the men would be able to adjust from guerrilla tactics to modern army strategy.
And when billions of dollars were thrown in for development, rampant corruption seemed inevitable, especially in a country that knows little about transparency and accountability in the modern sense of the words.
The Taleban, once driven out of power, readjusted, and their strategy now includes coming to the negotiating table while at the same time carrying out isolated, high-profile attacks.
For much of the past 11 years, the US strategy in Afghanistan has centred on hunting down Osama bin Laden, destroying his al-Qaeda sanctuaries, and stopping the Taleban from regaining ground. There was success in only two of these goals, though some would say two out of three isn’t bad.
Along the way, the US has afforded Afghans a chance to build a better country. More girls attend school now, and the people have reconnected with the rest of the world. But building national institutions is a long-term commitment, one that has to be carried out according to the pace, terms and direction the Afghans can handle.
The same goes for political settlement. The US and its allies should have withdrawn after driving the Taleban from Kabul and al-Qaeda from the country. It is unfortunate that it took them a decade to realise they’re going to have to let the Afghans – including the government, Taleban, Northern Alliance and various other tribal warlords – sort this mess out themselves.
A modern, democratic nation-state might not be the structure that’s needed in Afghanistan at this point in time. Unless there is a genuine desire by Afghan leaders and the people to establish one, all the money in the world won’t make a difference.