It is somewhat disturbing to see how senior government officials are rushing to the conclusion that the recent spike in violence in the deep South – including the killing of Yala’s vice-governor, Issara Thongthawat, and provincial civil-defence chief Whaowalit Chai-ruek – is unrelated to the ongoing peace talks.
The violence in the troubled region, whether it has spiked or lessened, and as long as it is still a fact of daily life, is precisely the reason why the Thai government sent National Security Council chief Paradorn Pattanatabut to talk to the so-called separatists.
Of all people, Paradorn should know that, in an insurgency conflict – as opposed to conventional warfare – all the militants need to do to remain relevant is simply exist. Violence becomes a communicative action to destroy the will and morale of the security forces in particular and the government in general – at least to the point that the state will succumb to some or all of the militants’ demands.
And so when the self-proclaimed separatist leaders appeared in front of the news media on February 28 in Kuala Lumpur, the Thai public and the international community were led to believe that a new chapter had opened in this conflict. The two sides held their second meeting on March 28, and the next one will take place after the general election in Malaysia.
Because of the February 28 announcement, people crossed their fingers and hoped for the better. They took the government’s word for it that the authorities are doing the right thing by talking to these self-proclaimed representatives of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate.
The BRN-C delegates came to the signing ceremony with all sorts of titles, from “coordinator for the movement to the Malaysian authorities” to “head of the women’s faction”. But all eyes were focused on Hasan Toib, one man who didn’t give himself a title. He simply called himself a “liaison” person, which presumably means he will talk to other separatist organisations about the merits of talking to the Thai government.
Sources in the separatist movement, as well as in the Thai and Malaysian governments, say that banking on Hasan was a big leap of faith, but had to be done to satisfy the political necessity in the two capitals.
The February 28 ceremony was supposed to kick-start a peace process, but so far no one of any note has attended the talks. One might argue that it’s too soon. One can also point out that the Thai side has never asked Hasan to demonstrate his influence among the militants. Is Hasan even a BRN-C insider?
Sources in the BRN-C have told The Nation that Hasan is an “opportunist” agreeing to be used by Bangkok. Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, they believe, wants to use the talks to whitewash her fugitive brother – who was ousted in the 2006 coup for, among other things, worsening the situation in the South.
The government should try a little honesty and place national interest above party politics.
Because the Thai negotiators are operating on a Pheu Thai Party platform, rather than in the interest of national security, they must explain why Paradorn and his subordinates are so eager to dismiss any suggestion that the spike in violence is a reaction to the “peace process”.
Perhaps the insurgents were just indifferent to the February 28 event. Perhaps they saw a high-value target – the vice-governor’s brand-new sedan being escorted by Defence Volunteer vehicles – and went for it.
After all, it isn’t the first time that a vice-governor, a governor, or even the head of the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre, has come under attack from insurgent gunmen or fallen victim to a roadside bomb.