China and Japan need to cool it over insignificant islands

On January 19, Chinese warships in the East China Sea reportedly locked fire-control radars on a Japanese Self-Defence Force helicopter and, on January 30 did the same to a Self-Defence Force ship. Fire-control radars provide signals to guide missiles and gunfire to targets, and lock-on is the last step before a decision to shoot. 

The dispute heated up last August, when Chinese and then Japanese activists briefly landed on the islands and, in September, when the Japanese government purchased three of the five small islands from a private Japanese owner. The move was designed to pre-empt their planned purchase by the ultra-nationalist governor of Tokyo – who, the government feared, would aggravate relations with China. But China responded with diplomatic denunciations and cancellation of high-level meetings. It also stepped up deployments of paramilitary ships into waters around the islands, backed by naval forces operating farther away. Beijing appears determined to challenge Japan’s administrative control over the islands.

The two sides have taken several steps up the escalation ladder, including the release of duelling government reports making the case for each side’s “indisputable” sovereignty as well repeated Chinese infringements of Japanese-administered waters and air space. Some Chinese scholars and retired army officers even talk about conditions under which China should start a war with Japan over the islands. 

Each step and counter-step in reaffirming claims increases risk of an accident or miscalculation leading to conflict. This situation is not in the interest of China, Japan, the US or the broader Asia-Pacific region. A breakdown in China-Japan relations would inevitably disrupt the supply-chain network that links all of East Asia and deal a serious blow to the regional economy

The debate over ownership of the islands goes back centuries. But contemporary pleadings often reference the 1894-95 Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese war, during which Japan incorporated the islands; the 1945 Potsdam Declaration; negotiations of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty in which the concept of Japan’s “residual sovereignty” over the islands found its way into the lexicon of diplomacy; and finally the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, which returned US administrative control over the islands to Japan. Analysing the respective claims and counter-claims matters little in terms of ameliorating current tensions. 

The sovereignty dispute cannot be resolved in this heavily charged atmosphere, especially given the complication of Taiwan’s competing claim over the islands. The immediate policy challenge is to minimise risks of accidents and miscalculation in a narrow geographic area.

Assuming both China and Japan share an interest in avoiding conflict, we offer the following prescriptions, some easier to implement than others. All require restraint and mutual accommodation.

Mutual reduction of patrols: Both nations should begin by decreasing frequency of patrols, limiting them to white-hulled, non-military ships. Both sides should ultimately commit to restrain landings of activists and refrain from any construction on the islands. On the Chinese side, restraint also entails not sending State Oceanic Administration planes into the area. Japan does not have Coast Guard aircraft that can intercept these Chinese planes; its only response is to use military aircraft from Okinawa, as happened in December. Air patrols increase the chance of lives being lost in an accident.

Open talks to implement the 2011 China-Japan agreement to establish a maritime crisis management mechanism: Working out the details will take time, but the fact that both governments recognise the need for such a mechanism could restore calm and rebuild confidence. China has military hotlines with Russia, South Korea and the US to manage potential escalation risks. Tokyo has repeatedly asked for such a hotline, only to be met with a Chinese response that the time is not appropriate. If not now, when?  

Mutual agreement on a public diplomacy ceasefire: Tokyo and Beijing have made their respective positions abundantly clear. The two sides are now talking past each other, instead addressing their respective domestic audiences and pleading their respective cases to international actors appalled at the prospect of China and Japan risking military conflict over tiny rocks. Repetition only serves to inflame domestic opinion and strengthen the other side’s resolve. A ceasefire in public exchanges could calm tensions and give quiet diplomacy a chance.

There is very little that the US or the international community can do. The Abe-Obama Summit reaffirmed existing US and Japanese policy positions on the Senkakus. The unstated bottom line, given the stakes involved for the world’s three largest economies, is a call for actions that support peaceful management of the region.

The key question, of course, is, “Who goes first?” Reaching an accommodation is the province of diplomats working on behalf of strong and committed political leaders. Although Chinese Party Secretary Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Abe have taken assertive positions, both also appear to understand the larger stakes involved in the bilateral relationship. Both may be looking for a way to move beyond exchanges of well-worn talking points. Initial actions to de-escalate the dispute need not be publicly announced, but must be reciprocated. 

Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is a new stability, where both sides limit the frequency, size and duration of patrols to reinforce their claims and employ only paramilitary forces in a predictable and non-provocative manner. 

Once political traction has been re-established, it may be possible to deal with the islands in a manner that befits their actual insignificance. For now, de-escalation is the better part of valour and of national interest. Farther down the road, creative solutions may become possible. Imagine a future summit in which Chinese and Japanese political leaders simultaneously divest sovereignty and establish the islands as an International Nature and Wildlife Preserve.

 

James Przystup is a senior research fellow and Phillip Saunders is director of the Centre for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs in the US National Defence University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. 

 

Yale Centre for the study of globalisation.