
The shift in the centre of the world economy from the transatlantic to the transpacific region conforms with Asia’s economic rise, principally due to globalisation allowing freer flow of capital, technology and management skills. Global outsourcing brings markets together and rebalances the world economy, eventually transforming the international structure in a peaceful manner.
China has caught up with globalisation through international cooperation. Beijing is both a major beneficiary of globalisation and a main contributor to the peaceful evolution of a new world order. However, while the United States has contributed to China’s peaceful rise, it has also, out of interest in maintaining its paramount status in the world, been watching China’s rise with concern.
Some of these concerns make sense, since the US has shaped so much of the status quo, which stresses stability – a sort of Pax Americana, benefiting nearly all parties. It is predictable that a status quo power wishes to preserve the existing balance of power and has concerns about a rising power. Given this, China needs to present its genuine intention, in a clear way, that it does not want to supplant the US’s leadership. The two countries have a great deal to clarify regarding their respective suspicions on strategic issues, especially in areas of common concern such as climate change, outer space, maritime issues and cyberspace.
Not all US concerns are legitimate. For example, the US worries about the implications of the rise of the Chinese mainland as it relates to its ability to reunify with Taiwan. Nevertheless, this is not a legitimate interest of the US, and China cannot be responsible for US concerns over the matter, simply because of Beijing’s rise.
The US’s “rebalance” in Asia has an eye on China, even if Washington tries to deny it. If one side views such moves as hedging, it is natural that counter-hedging may be evoked. A game of balancing and rebalancing is, at the very least, counterproductive.
China and the US could opt for a more proactive approach, viewing each side’s interaction with the region in a more positive light. For instance, the Trans-Pacific Partnership could push China to deepen its economic reforms. Similarly, the US could ponder its response to Sino-Japanese tension over the Diaoyu Islands. Instead of supporting Japan by citing a treaty obligation, which only fuels tensions, the US could help ease the situation by presenting constructive reconciliation.
Beijing and Washington have much to gain by cooperating in Southeast Asia, in areas ranging from anti-piracy to curbing global warming. Even on the issue of demarcating maritime interests, they share far more common interests than divergence: protecting international waters for peaceful access, tapping maritime resources in a legally sound and environmentally sustainable manner, collaborating bilaterally or multilaterally on humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and avoiding incidents at sea through security cooperation.
After some preparation, China and Asean countries have begun talks on the South China Sea Code of Conduct, a significant move to resolve various territorial disputes in the region. While the US pushes the envelope, it will be viewed as a respectful player only if it addresses in a holistic way all aspects of the disputes, including the fact that China’s claims some disputed islands and islets have been occupied by a few Asean states that the US supports now.
Shen Dingli is professor and associate dean of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University.