Heat is being turned up on 'fortified' Prayut

Last week, he was a couple of provoking questions away from totally losing it, although some critics will say a few toys had already been sent flying out of the pram. Prayut ended the strange showdown with reporters with an apologetic “wai” gesture, which added weirdness to the supposed Thai dictatorship. Not many dictators do that.

But what kind of a leader Prayut is doesn’t matter much, as it can’t prevent clips of his “emotional” moments making their way to every tablet or desktop near you. The heat is obviously on, and it absolutely shows. And as the saying goes, anyone who can’t stand it must leave the kitchen.

To General Prayut, time must be flying faster than it seems to most other Thais. More than a quarter of a year has passed since his coup against the Pheu Thai-led administration in May. A lot has happened in politics since: He has become the country’s interim prime minister; an interim Parliament has been set up; a “reform” assembly has taken shape; a military reshuffle has occurred; and a fragile political peace has somehow endured.

The red shirts have been relatively quiet. There are rumours about a conflict with Privy Council chief Prem Tinsulanonda and conspiracy theories concerning “secret arrangements” between Prayut and Thaksin. But all that is just a prelude to the real “trial by fire”, which has yet to come, though its gathering heat is making the man in the kitchen uncomfortable.

No matter how slow the process seems where “reform” pledged by Prayut is concerned, there is no avoiding what promises to be another major political climax for the country. Prayut, who has promised to get bitterly divided Thais to live peacefully together, will be walking a very thin tightrope. Criticism over the composition of the reformist assembly will be nothing compared to what will follow when it gets down to work and contemplates clashing ideological measures.

Should there be a Senate? If so, should it be appointed or elected? These are just the easier questions the reformists will face. A slightly tougher one has to do with the roles and power of anti-graft institutions or independent bodies like the Constitutional Court. All of them have been instrumental in guiding the political course of Thailand over the years. Rightly or wrongly, they have been discredited by one half of Thailand and complimented by the other. How can the country have an anti-corruption apparatus that is acceptable to both camps?

Then there are the less political issues that may, nevertheless, be of utmost importance – like education. And apart from measures designed for politicians, the reformists must also figure out ways to reshape the national conscience so that the divided Thai people judge such issues as corruption, budget use, agricultural subsidies and mega concessions with the same principles. Thailand’s political crisis has become serious and deep-rooted not because politicians see those issues differently, but because the ordinary Thai people do.

Prayut has consolidated his power, or analysts think he has, through changes in the military. He has also sought to quash rumours about rifts between him and Privy Council chief Prem. It could be said that things have been unfolding pretty much step by step in accordance with his roadmap – from the appointment of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) that elected him as prime minister, to his hand-picked Cabinet, to the annual military reshuffle that seemed to defuse threats of a counter-coup, and on to the selection of members of the National Reform Council (NRC) – which critics say is filled with too many pro-Prayut figures for comfort.

Last but not least, his participation in the Asia-Europe Meeting in Italy did not end in a PR disaster, though his “I won’t stay a single day longer than promised” has now become an international pledge translated into several languages.

No matter how consolidated and secure his power seems, political reform is not about having the military top brass and the entire Parliament on your side or about registering high approval ratings in opinion polls. It’s a lot more than that. Prayut is attempting what a normal Parliament under the pro-Thaksin administration failed miserably at, and a special democratic process leading to the drafting of the 1997 Constitution only provided short-lived glimpses of hope for.

Prayut may have been given the time he needs. But in politics, things can change very quickly and what looks like an impregnable fortress can crumble in mere days. He only needs to recall how strong the Yingluck administration was before a political bill turned everything upside down. What Prayut’s consolidated power has to steer through, moreover, is a lot more complicated and potentially explosive than that amnesty legislation.

But first things first: one can’t call for patience by appearing to lose patience himself. He was dead wrong about one thing. A journalist’s work isn’t finished when the article is published. Whatever Prayut does next, new articles will be written about it. He has to live with that and bear with them, just as he wants the country to bear with him.