Three-way strife may be likely now

Some used to say it could not get any worse than Thais being divided to the brink of civil war. The coup in May, according to its leader and interim Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, was meant to pre-empt what could be a political bloodbath. First there was hope in the wake of the coup, but with the military junta struggling to keep public faith, new fears are looming. Thais can basically split into three camps instead of two currently. That will make national strife a lot more complicated, if not worse.

The latest case of media intimidation is undermining Prayut's pledge to bring about genuine reform. But what happened at the Thai PBS is not the only hindrance to efforts to bring political peace to Thailand. Prayut's interim government has alienated a lot of supporters with energy policies that seem to lean toward big money rather than public interests. Anti-corruption promises have been in danger of falling through, although the jury is very much out on how the controversial rice scheme of the Yingluck administration is addressed. The red shirts are not happy, and neither are the yellow shirts. Those in between may still be willing to give Prayut a chance, but scepticism is eating into their patience.

If Thailand is politically split into “three kingdoms”, romance is out of question. Yet the possibility of  a three-camp political landscape that is looking increasingly likely and it will be anything but healthy. It used to be a pro- and anti-Thaksin divide but a third movement may soon emerge and say no to both the military and tainted democracy. If reform is hard when Thais are split down the middle, imagine the difficulties a three-way strife can present.

During the political turmoil last year and earlier this year, the military escaped blame. But the Armed Forces stuck its neck out with the coup and now will have to bear the brunt of criticism if the situation worsens. Much depends on what Prayut does next, as he now wields the biggest political power.

Make no mistake, genuine reform means he's bound to galvanise many foes and lose many friends. But if he is sincere and carry out his agenda with integrity, it will be his best protection. Prayut's relatively high approval rating in the aftermath of the coup did not reflect a pro-military or pro-dictatorship stand among Thais, but it showed how much hope politically weary Thais had for positive changes. Intimidating the media and stirring doubts regarding such mammoth issues as energy and corruption eradication are certainly not the way to go. Reform is painful, but the pain must be where it's worth it. 

Vested interests groups are abundant in Thailand, and many of them are internationally connected. Speculation has already begun about those at the very top of Thailand's political war successfully dividing the cake, leaving the “colours” to continue their ideological fight. It's this kind of speculation, and the likes of the Thai PBS incidents, that will hasten the formation of the “third movement”. Like the anti-Thaksin camp, they won't accept the Shinawatras' return to power. But like the pro-Thaksin camp, they will also find the military playing a leading role in politics unacceptable.

In normal political circumstances, such a third movement can create a healthy environment in which everybody is kept on his toes. In Thai circumstances, where Prayut is reigning supreme, it can make his “reform” agenda a lot more difficult and contribute to a major deadlock. With Thailand's neighbouring countries preparing themselves economically for the upcoming era of the Asean Economic Community, Thais will practically limp into the new regional territory.