Thaksin in Seoul: deja vu all over again?
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Will the man in exile make it "harder" or "easier" for himself and everyone else?
Thaksin Shinawatra will emerge from his “glass closet of seclusion” and speak at an international conference in South Korea tomorrow. Everything about it is all too familiar: The timing is conspicuous; the Thai government has one eye on it but tries to act like it couldn’t be bothered; the outspoken enemies are asking why his passport has not been revoked; and calls for everyone to “step beyond Thaksin” are getting loud and clear.
It’s a forum that allows key guests to express their economic visions on Asia’s future. That Thaksin has been invited is probably not as interesting as the forum coinciding with a legal event in Thailand. His sister Yingluck Shinawatra is having an important date with the Thai court regarding the controversial rice scheme of her government. Many people, therefore, link what has been transpiring in Thailand to what Thaksin may have to say in South Korea. There has also been speculation that it is his publicists who arranged his participation in the Seoul conference for political purposes.
What Thaksin will say at the forum, or in interviews on the sidelines, will almost certainly go under a microscope. The Pheu Thai camp has lambasted those who have a “knee-jerk” reaction to his participation in the forum. Thaksin would not say anything that would hurt Thailand, Pheu Thai insisted. To his political rivals, that does not guarantee anything, as “Thailand” and the “anti-Thaksin elements” can always be treated separate entities. In other words, Thaksin can still hurt his “enemies” but not Thailand.
The South Korean forum can bring the debate over successes or failures of the “Thaksinomics” back to life. The controversial doctrine that mixed populist policies with massive spending on mega-projects and fast-paced free-trade agreements has its fans and critics. He may choose to talk about it again although that could bring him dangerously close to the hot Thai local topic – the criminal proceedings against Yingluck, whose rice-pledging scheme seemed to embody the good and bad of “Thaksinomics”.
We can see how a Thaksin speech on economic vision can be politically sensitive. After all, Thailand’s political strife is rooted in the serious disagreement over whether he was a great economic visionary who was victimised for getting too popular among the poor, or whether his economic doctrine was more like a tool and shield to advance and protect vested interests, most of them his. Despite calls basically from all sides for everyone to “go beyond Thaksin” and move on, the disagreement remains at the core of the Thai political conflict.
When Thaksin was prime minister, he visited Seoul in 2005. Two years earlier, late South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun visited Thailand. Both countries also go back a long way and Thailand was the second nation after the United States to send troops to support South Korea during the Korean War. It’s unlikely, though, that what Thaksin does in South Korea will have a dramatic impact on bilateral relations.
Yet a few things will be at stake when Thaksin takes the podium. On the one hand, what he says will have an impact on Thailand, more or less. On the other hand, what he says will also have an impact on himself. His fight with his political enemies have dented Thailand’s image and disrupted the country’s development, but it also has had a direct effect on his future, political or else. His choice is obvious: He can choose to make it harder for everyone including himself, or he can choose to make it a little easier for everyone including himself.
