With each passing day, the question of how a divided Thailand can be reconciled becomes stickier. Not least after Thaksin Shinawatra’s latest passport revocation, the impeachment of and planned legal action against ousted prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission’s recently disclosed intention not to spare former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and deputy prime minister Suthep Thaugsuban. These cases together represent the crux of the crisis – disagreement over what defies “corruption”, how corruption should be dealt with, and how far protesters can go in the pursuit of justice.
Abhisit and Suthep face impeachment and possible legal proceedings in connection with the 2010 crackdown on the red-shirt protests, which had in their midst the complicating factor of armed elements. The demonstrators were encamped in downtown Bangkok for weeks, disrupting traffic and business, after a court ordered a large swath of Thaksin’s ill-gotten wealth to be seized. They also shared an unabated sense of injustice over the dissolution of the People Power Party, which had fairly won an election and formed a coalition government.
That PPP government had an Abhisit-style problem of its own. Its crackdown on a protest by the People’s Alliance for Democracy resulted in several deaths. The consequences combined with other factors to dislodge the PPP from power and install the Abhisit-Suthep government. Meanwhile the People’s Alliance also blockaded Suvarnabhumi Airport, one in a series of disturbing incidents by which it sought to make a point but earned only shame.
In politics, Thais are like a dog chasing its own tail. The revocation of Thaksin’s passport – which ex-foreign minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul immediately vowed to undo as soon as his camp is back in power – is part of a vicious cycle.
Any reform we might achieve will pacify one side but galvanise the other to protest. Lopsided reform will not lead to reconciliation.
The bigger problem, it now seems, is that, even if a measure of justice (since blanket justice seems beyond hope) is served in an unequal manner, not everyone will accept it. The rival sides have resorted to eye-for-an-eye tactics for too long. Ideological bias is too deep-rooted.
Legal action against Abhisit and Suthep will raise questions about the crackdown on the PAD, as it is surely intended. What the Alliance did was more or less mirrored by the red shirts, and by protesters subsequently led by Suthep against the Yingluck government for that matter.
It must also be noted that legal actions taken against Yingluck, Abhisit and Suthep have been initiated under military rule. This fact alone sows the seed for future conflict, and debate over the draft constitution is poised to germinate it.
Our tail-chasing scenario proceeds like this: Democracy infected by corruption, an uprising against corruption, the disruption of democracy, a pro-democracy uprising, the restoration of democracy, and renewed seepage of corruption. True reform will have to sever that unholy chain of events, namely by terminating the tendency to corruption. First, however, ideological rivals must realise that they cannot break the cycle by repeatedly, violently, wresting power from those in government.
Politics is not a matter of “It’s my turn now.” Such an attitude dooms from the start any action deemed “reconciliatory”.
To end or even to ease the strife, the other side’s grievances must be acknowledged rather than papered over with the aid of legal or political advantage. Sincerity is easier to praise than demonstrate, of course, and it will take time before efforts bear fruit. Nevertheless, the country has no other choice.