The growing influence of ISIS in Southeast Asia

Jakarta was rocked by two bomb explosions in its business and shopping district last Thursday, accompanied by an attack on a police post and a Starbucks outlet using improvised grenades and home-made handguns. Four civilians were killed, along with four of the attackers, while more than 20 persons were injured. The Indonesian police as well as the propaganda machine of the Islamic State (IS) have claimed that followers of IS were responsible. Although the intention was to cause the mass casualties seen in the Paris attacks of November 13, the terrorists’ lack of training and inadequate weapons resulted in far fewer lives lost.

One significant lesson that can be drawn from last Thursday’s attacks is the importance of developing societal resilience. Ordinary people joined celebrities and politicians in Jakarta in condemning the attacks. In a departure from the response to terrorist atrocities between 2002 and 2009, they broadcast messages on social media that drew attention to the incompetence of the perpetrators and stressed solidarity with the victims. If their intention was to cause ordinary citizens to cower in fear, the attackers failed.

 

Islamic State responsibility

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria claimed responsibility for the attacks, which according to Indonesia’s police chief were planned by IS through Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian national. Bahrun is now in Syria but spent a year in an Indonesian jail in 2011 for illegal possession of weapons. His case triggered follow-up raids in which 12 people were detained and weapons seized in West Java, East Java and East Kalimantan. For Southeast Asians, the IS claims of responsibility are significant.

A recent RSIS study discussed the establishment of Khatibah Nusantara, a dedicated Southeast Asia military unit within IS which uses Malay/Indonesian for communication and has formed a separate fighting unit in Syria. Khatibah Nusantara captured five Kurd-held territories in April last year. Led by an emir, identified as Abu Ibrahim al-Indunisiy, the unit appears to be led by Indonesians, but Malaysians are active within the group. This development highlights IS’ intention of building a regional network intended to support the establishment of a province (wilayah) in Southeast Asia. The emergence of IS and its claims to have established a caliphate is thus having a significant impact on Southeast Asia. The threat will continue over the next decade. Hence, it is important to understand how IS rose to prominence.

 

How IS rose to prominence

Washington’s anti-Baathist policy following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 resulted in the removal of Iraqi civil servants who had served in his administration as well as the exclusion of military and intelligence officers from the new administration set up in Baghdad. This decision is critical in understanding the effectiveness of IS in Iraq. Today, former military officers and bureaucrats from Saddam’s administration form the core of IS in Iraq, which controls vast swathes of territory in northern and western Iraq.

In Syria, Bashir al-Assad financed, armed and trained al-Qaeda activists who crossed the border to attack the Americans from 2005 up until the American withdrawal from Iraq. Growing numbers of al-Qaeda supporters pledged allegiance to IS following the proclamation of a caliphate by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the establishment of the Islamic State, on June 29, 2014 – Ramadan. IS now controls significant territory in eastern Syria. American officials claim that Assad’s forces attack moderate Muslim opposition forces and avoid confronting IS. The reality is that IS represents the alternative to Assad’s cruel regime, but Syrian government troops are focusing their firepower on the weaker opposing forces. An escalating Sunni-Shia civil war is taking place, and no easy options exist.

Even if concerted action by Western powers and their allies results in the retaking of IS-held territories in Iraq and Syria, the idea of the Islamic State has captured the imaginations of sympathisers seeking a return to an imagined pristine way of Muslim life in the 7th century. Libya, which has emerged as an arms supermarket for North and West Africa, could easily morph into the new centre for the caliphate.

Impact on Southeast Asia

 

Three conclusions may be drawn regarding the impact of these developments on Southeast Asia. 

First, trends in the Middle East have exerted a growing influence in recent years. Competition in Syria between IS and an al-Qaeda offshoot, the al-Nusra Front, has been replicated in our region. Singaporeans have joined the growing numbers of Southeast Asians who have journeyed to Syria and Iraq to participate in the conflict.

The claim by IS that its self-declared caliphate has oversight over Muslims around the world has strong emotional appeal and resonance for many Muslims, even in Southeast Asia. While the number of such adherents is relatively small, their willingness to engage in armed attacks and cause mayhem on the streets has resulted in regional governments paying close attention to those radicalised by IS propaganda being spread through the social media.

While Muslims are a minority in Singapore, the city-state is seen by IS as the heart of the archipelago. When the al-Qaeda affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah earlier developed a network to establish an Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) linking Malaysia, Indonesia, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand, it included Singapore. With the rise of the Islamic State, a more potent threat will exist in the decade ahead.

Second, the challenge to Muslim religious leaders in the region arising from more radical versions of Islam emerging in response to conditions in the Middle East has been a recurrent theme in Southeast Asian history. In 1803, Minangkabau pilgrims inspired by Saudi Arabian Wahhabi doctrine returned to West Sumatra and launched the padri revolts against the local Sufi-inspired elite. Questioning the more traditional Sufi practices in the region, scholars and religious teachers returning from Arabia sought a return to the practices of Islam in the 7th century.

Third, acts of terrorism and political violence in the region will occur. Governments are now more alert but it will be difficult to eliminate all threats by IS followers in the region operating in clandestine cells. Attacks in the region have been by organised groups so far. Ratcheting up the frequency of attacks would trigger a sense of insecurity and threat to public order. Members of the public will have to get used to a larger police presence, more precautionary measures such as baggage checks and searches of vehicles, and closer monitoring of any contacts with religious militants. 

However, Southeast Asia’s Islamist militants do not have the power to overthrow governments. The risk is that governments in Muslim-majority states might adopt policies intended to win over those who view the religious agenda of IS positively, even if they disagree with its methods, resulting in increasing religious intolerance in the region.

 

Barry Desker is a distinguished fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was Singapore’s ambassador to Indonesia from 1986 to 1993.