Constitutional Court and 'duties of government'

The draft charter is now expected to carry a clause obliging the government to fulfill some key “duties”, namely budgetary prudence and promotion of anti-corruption awareness. The constitutional drafters hope to enforce that by giving the Constitution Court the same formidable power which has been decried by one side of the political divide. In short, the charter court will still be able to bring down any government.
This confirms that reform and reconciliation are not only two separate things, but also processes that are likely to clash with each other. Simply put, the drafters are handling issues that have brought us to this point in the first place. “Unconstitutional” practices have been the crux of the country's political strife, because one side gives total legitimacy to elected representatives while the other insists we need judges to keep those elected representatives in line.
The disagreement is a tough nut to crack. For example, a political party may win an election by promising something that requires a little budgetary risk. When that party becomes the government, should it wield the “legitimacy” by taking the risk with no restraint or should it be supervised by a group of men who can determine, in effect potentially overruling what voters wanted, whether such a risk is unconstitutional? There is no easy answer.
In many democracies in the world, there are such judges, although their courts may have been called differently. Unfortunately for Thailand, the Constitution Court has been in the middle of the political conflict, and its rulings have been rejected or scorned by one side of the divide. To be fair to the court, though, many of its critics must have forgotten that it once banned the most powerful Democrat figure for five years and acquitted Thaksin Shinawatra in the share concealment scandal.
What has been virtually left unsaid is the fact that every political principle is a two-edged sword. While a government can abuse its “legitimacy”, a Constitution Court can also be corrupted itself. While it seems all right to prescribe “government duties”, the prescription can also cause endless trouble if misused.
However, it's highly unlikely, or impossible even, for Thailand to do away with the Constitution Court. This leaves political parties with a big task of adaptation. They must have truly knowledgeable constitutional experts work effectively for them. This won't solve the fundamental disagreement entirely, but it will be like a car's bumper. It will hopefully help pre-empt blatant practices that could be deemed unconstitutional.
Constitutional advisers working for each party can promote democracy if they do their jobs responsibly and honourably. Thailand has had too many “Guardians of democracy” and too few people to really “observe” democracy. We have had too many people promoting “merits” of democracy and too few concerned about reinforcing its key elements.

At the end of the day, it's not just about how much power the Constitution Court has or what the government must do or must not do. Written words can only go so far, and Thailand has tried a great variety of them. To say that people must support and foster democracy is easy. To get a really healthy democracy _ the only way to bring back national harmony _ is absolutely difficult. A flawed democracy, especially in Thailand, opens itself for attacks, and the only way to correct that is for everyone, not just politicians and judges, to really know and fulfill his or her democratic duty.