
Diplomatically, Thailand has been nothing short of a fearful, paranoid animal. While the country has its own political trouble to blame for the panicky behaviour, the roles of some foreign governments, media, activists and publicists or lobbyists have added to what critics taunt as a growing xenophobia. Thais’ trust in some “friendly countries” has turned extremely fragile, a situation exacerbated by social media.
The situation has not changed since August 7. The Thai referendum on the controversial draft charter does not seem to convince foreign doubters that the outcome is legitimate. They appear disturbed by the results, actually. Led by a superpower, an international “stand” seems to be that nothing short of a quick return to democratic elections would do.
In the Thai crisis, one negativity feeds off another, and the line between blessings and curses is very thin. The attitudes of key foreign players are welcomed by some but have fanned bitterness among many others, who believe that outsiders have jumped the gun in analysing Thai politics. The Thai problem, this camp insists, is a lot more complicated than they can see.
When one takes a look at the Thai political divide, it’s hard to stay neutral. It’s understandably the same for foreigners, who are giving their sympathy to one side more than the other. There are two probably paradoxical things to consider here, though. The first is that everyone has the right to take sides, and resentful Thais should accept that right. The second is that taking sides has consequences, whether those taking sides accept it or not.
Thailand’s political crisis has turned from something curable into something chronic. This applies to diplomatic relations, too. At first, there was caution against being over-intrusive that could affect good ties, then there were warnings that being overly intrusive was damaging good ties, and finally, people were talking about badly damaged ties that could last a very long time. In other words, some damaged diplomatic relations are turning from curable to chronic.
To some foreign countries, it has become a big diplomatic gamble. They have gone “all in” without giving consideration to some very important things. They have failed to consider the possibility that Thailand is being divided down the middle, and one side, which they are not betting on, may continue to have its say on international diplomacy for a very long time. More crucially, however, they have failed to acknowledge that they may have misunderstood the Thai situation. Many senior foreign officials commenting on Thai affairs can’t even read Thai, so it’s very likely that they don’t know even half the story.
The “all in” approach is dangerous for obvious reasons. While the initial intentions were probably noble, the stakes have become a lot higher now. One side in the Thai conflict now has to win not because it’s “ideologically right” for them to win, but because their victory will serve the interests of “investors”.
The other side, meanwhile, must lose because it’s “anti” so and so. It used to be that one side in the Thai crisis couldn’t afford to lose, but things could become dangerous if its backers think they can’t afford to lose
themselves.
The Thai crisis has drastically altered the country’s diplomatic landscape and it will continue to do so after the referendum and the next election. One case can provide perspectives on what’s to come – the Yingluck government’s failure to win support for a NASA “weather project”. There are two important facts to consider regarding the case. First, Thailand was still a democracy then, governed by an “internationally friendly” administration. Second, the divide and “xenophobic” bitterness were strong then, but they were nowhere near as strong as feelings are today.