Army chiefs forever handcuffed in the South

Every general assigned to command the Fourth Army jurisdiction tries while overseeing day-to-day operations to make the best of the keen media attention directed that way, knowing his time in the contested southern region will last only until he’s promoted to the inner circle in Bangkok, as has proved inevitable in modern times. Bangkok is the prize and any regional command is a temporary posting, a stepping stone to the ultimate goal. Those handed the far South, as troublesome as it can be for the officials in charge, are under little pressure to find a way to end the conflict. The past 13 years suggest that such an accomplishment is an impossible dream anyway.
Instead, each new commander makes a grand show of introducing a fresh strategy that will achieve the impossible. It is human nature, after all, to wish to seem better than one’s predecessor. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the commanders merely pass along the exact same objective to their successors – to remove as many ethnic Malay insurgents from the field as possible, through kills, capture or coercion. Only the means to complete this mission vary.
Lieutenant General Piyawat Nakwanich, the man in charge since late last year, is no different from his predecessors despite earnest efforts to seem so. His personal touch has been demonstrating the utmost accessibility – when visiting conflict areas, he likes to shout out his phone number and invite any insurgents who might be listening to call him and discuss the terms of their surrender. He guarantees them fair treatment under the law and offers to helicopter into their jungle hideouts to ferry them out. Does it work? A few weeks ago, Piyawat rode a chopper into the middle of field to pick up a young man apparently ready to surrender. But the event was so obviously staged that security officials in Bangkok were shaking their heads in embarrassment.
Another ploy the commander has tried is called “Bring People Back Home”, a campaign that encourages parents (especially dear old mums) to persuade their renegade sons to quit the movement and surrender in exchange for fair treatment. Doing so ensures them that their name will be expunged from a government “black list”, but the local people are all too aware that, once on any of the several varieties of black lists, there’s no getting off.
When one media outlet reported recently that the insurgents are aiming to recruit a million new combatants over the next 15 years, General Piyawat demonstrated arrogance in lieu of professionalism and appalling shallowness in his understanding of the insurrection. He told reporters not to worry, since the deep South 15 years hence will be fully developed, with good roads and high-speed train service. There will no longer be a reason for anyone to take up arms against the state, he said.
Ignoring the insurgents’ fundamental grievance – that the Thai state denies the southern Malay-Muslim majority the basic dignities it is due – Piywat seeks to lecture them and other members of their community that they should swallow their pride, stop biting the hand that feeds them and behave like good citizens. He evidently does not understand why so many young people took up arms in the first place.
To be fair, none of the military men placed in charge of the region has been given a mandate to guide policy based on his own observations, much less set policy. The bloodshed in the South will continue as long as its political, administrative and military management remains centralised. If the situation is ever to improve, the government and Army must give the regional commander far greater authority.