Duterte and Xi talk war

That’s what President Rodrigo Duterte himself said, in an extraordinary disclosure last Friday. Duterte said he had raised the possibility of the Philippines drilling for oil in parts of its exclusive economic zone in the West Philippine Sea that are contested by China. “I said, ‘Mr Xi Jinping, I would insist that that is ours and I will drill oil there’.” 
Duterte reports that Xi replied: “We are friends. We do not want to quarrel with you. We want to maintain the present warm relationship. But if you force the issue, we’ll go to war.”
On Monday, Philippine Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano sought to play down the encounter, though he didn’t deny a threat of war had been made. 
“The context was not threatening each other … [with] war. The context is how do we stabilise the region and how do we prevent conflict. 
 “I will not contradict the president’s words. I am just telling you my interpretation: There was no bullying or pushing around – it was not a threat.”
Philippine Ambassador to China Chito Romana weighed in with his own interpretation of the exchange: “No threats, no bullying, everything was frank but friendly, candid but productive.”
It is possible of course for a threat to be issued even as the discussion remains “frank but friendly”. But the pivotal question remains: Did Xi, the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, actually use words which the interpreter translated into English as “we’ll go to war”? Neither Cayetano nor Romana denied that those words were used. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also declined to contradict Duterte’s account, with spokesperson Hua Chunying merely side-stepping questions about the conversation between the two heads of state. 
If China’s leader did indeed threaten Duterte with “war”, he may have meant something broader than simple force. Did Xi say that Beijing would use military or coast-guard action to prevent any Philippine drilling operation in the disputed area? This could be done without having to recall envoys, sever diplomatic relations, or suspend partnership agreements – as would be the case for a state of war. Was this all that Xi meant? If so, it would still be a serious form of reprisal – similar to the way that Chinese “fishing vessels” cut the cables of a Vietnamese ship surveying another disputed part of the South China Sea in 2012. But it would fall short of war. Part of the reason why Beijing has boosted its civilian Coast Guard is precisely to avoid getting its naval fleet directly involved in South China Sea disputes. A threat of this nature, then, would fall neatly into the pattern China has set in the last few years.
Or did Duterte make it all up? Did he concoct the threat in order to justify his muted position on Philippine territorial disputes with China, or on the international arbitral ruling against Beijing’s claim to most of the South China Sea? A majority of Filipinos remains distrustful of China, and supports an assertive position based on our history and the landmark arbitral ruling. In Duterte’s view, claiming that Xi said he’ll go to war shows that the Philippines is backed into a corner. “What more could I say?” he declared last Friday.
As a matter of fact, he could have told Xi many things, if Xi did indeed make the claimed threat. He could have declared his administration would now fully embrace the arbitral ruling. That we would now deepen cooperation with Vietnam, other claimants and our traditional allies. And not least, that we would abandon the bilateral consultation mechanism China has insisted on.
For years Manila refused bilateral talks with Beijing on maritime issues precisely because of fears China would dominate. What is Xi’s war threat if not unmistakable proof of domination?