Key differences between Deep South and the Moro rebellion

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2012
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The truce in the Philippines between Moro Muslims and authorities in Manila might spark hope among peace-lovers in Thailand to put more effort into seeking a similar solution for Malay Muslims in the Deep South.

 

However, there are differences in the fundamental characteristics of both movements as well as the response from central governments in the two countries, which suggest it would be very hard to achieve a similar resolution. 
Former Malay separatist leader Wan Kadir Che Man, in his PhD thesis, indicated that there were similarities between Moro and Malay separatists that provided legitimacy for them to resist domination from Manila and Bangkok respectively.
Being conscious of their respective historic and culturally coherent communities provided legitimacy and inspiration to their struggles, Che Man said in his thesis “Muslim Separatism: the Moros of Southern Philippines and Malays of Southern Thailand”.
Historically, communities of Moro and Malay Muslims existed long before their annexation by predominantly Christian states – in case of the Philippines – and the Buddhist state, in the case of Thailand. Resistance movements arose around the same period, between the early to mid-twentieth century, after their regions were incorporated into greater states.
Similarly, according to Che Man, political and religious leaders were often involved in the struggle. There were some religious elements in their struggles at the beginning. A combination of ethno-religious notions made strong sense for the struggle.
Other external factors, such as intervention by neighbouring countries, western countries, as well as international Islamic movements, also contributed to resistance in the Philippine south and Thailand’s Deep South over recent decades.
The fundamental difference – which is key for success, as Che Man put it in his thesis, was the ability of the two movements to pose a threat to central authorities in Manila and Bangkok. Leaders of the Malay movement in southern Thailand were less able to pose a serious threat to Bangkok, he said.
However, Che Man conducted his research in the 1980s and published it in 1990, when the separatist movement in southern Thailand was about to decline. The current wave of Malay struggle is a bit difference from his time. Links between old and new generations of fighters in southern Thailand are very weak, while the Moro have had a continuity of movement.
The head of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Murad Ebrahim, who sat to talk with the Philippine President Beningo Aquino, is a man from history. In the same generation of Che Man, Ebrahim joined the separatist movement in 1972, at the start with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which later split and became the MILF.
The Malay struggle in southern Thailand these days is a faceless movement. They have no declared manifesto but simply create violence to hurt and make trouble. The current wave of insurgency erupted in early 2004 and has seen some 5,000 people killed, mostly Malay Muslims, but nobody knows exactly what objectives and goals they really want to achieve.
It is very hard to establish peace talks between these fighters and the authorities in Bangkok, given this. Thai governments since 2004 have not really known who they are fighting. Attempts to establish talks have failed several times in the past, as the authorities were not able to contact the right people. Senior officials from Bangkok met so-called separatists in the same generation as Che Man several times in Malaysia, and elsewhere, but these have not yet led to real peace talks.
More importantly, even if Bangkok was able to contact the “right people”, they may not dare to offer any form of autonomy, as Manila has done with the Moro. The Thai elite maintain a strong belief – which might be wrong – that the Malay Muslims will assimilate into Thai monoculture, and that entities should work to restore peace in the region.