Thailand is revisiting one of its oldest emergency energy laws as the government weighs how far it may need to go if conflict in the Middle East escalates into a prolonged supply shock.
The legal tool dates back to the first global oil crisis of 1973-74, when the Arab oil embargo and production cuts sent crude prices soaring and exposed Thailand’s vulnerability as a major energy importer.
That shock prompted the Thai government to issue the Emergency Decree on the Correction and Prevention of Fuel Shortages in 1973, giving the prime minister sweeping powers to respond quickly to a fuel crisis. The decree remains part of Thailand’s official crisis-management framework today.
Thailand had already felt the impact of the 1973 oil shock, when crude prices jumped from about US$3 a barrel to nearly US$12 within months, fuelling inflation, worsening the trade balance and deepening economic and political strains at home.
A second major oil crisis followed in 1979-80 after the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war disrupted Middle Eastern supply, again hitting Thailand hard because of its dependence on imported oil. Those crises later helped drive policy efforts to reduce reliance on foreign oil, including greater use of domestic natural gas. This historical backdrop is why the 1973 decree still carries weight in energy policy discussions today.
Under the decree, the prime minister can issue immediate orders covering the production, sale, transport, possession, stockpiling, export and import of all types of fuel. The powers also extend to electricity and other forms of energy, as well as to activities that consume energy.
That means the government could, in principle, impose fuel rationing, restrict operating hours for factories, cinemas, entertainment venues and restaurants, set conditions on vehicle use, and control electricity consumption in buildings and for advertising. Violations can carry severe penalties, including jail terms and fines. These powers were designed to allow rapid, centralised action rather than relying on separate ministries to respond under ordinary laws.
The issue has returned to the spotlight because the current government has openly discussed legal tools it could deploy if the Middle East conflict worsens and starts to threaten Thailand’s energy security more seriously. Thai media and official references show that Prime Ministerial Order No. 2/2569 under the 1973 decree was issued on March 6, 2026, while recent government discussions have also referenced further emergency measures if the situation intensifies.
According to current Thai crisis-planning documents, the most severe “red” scenario would involve oil supply disruption lasting more than six months, or liquefied petroleum gas supply disruption of more than 14 days, together with fuel reserves falling towards the legal minimum.
In that case, the Energy Ministry could propose fuel-rationing measures under the 1973 decree, alongside broader conservation steps under emergency-administration laws. Those steps could include limits on opening hours for department stores and petrol stations, and even curfews aimed at cutting electricity and fuel consumption. These thresholds are reflected in Thailand’s energy crisis preparedness framework.
For now, however, the government says such drastic action is not yet necessary. Officials have repeatedly said Thailand still has enough fuel reserves for around 95-100 days, though earlier statements in late February put reserve cover at about 61 days before additional supply measures were arranged. The Energy Ministry and the prime minister have both urged the public not to panic, saying current shortages seen at some filling stations have been linked more to hoarding and distribution strain than to a true nationwide lack of oil.
That said, the fact that the government has dusted off a decree first born out of the 1973 oil shock underlines how seriously it is taking the present risk. Even if Thailand is not yet facing a full-blown shortage, the return of this old legal instrument shows that policymakers are preparing for the possibility that a regional war could become an energy crisis severe enough to require extraordinary state intervention.