Thaksin case shifts politics, conservatives may rethink strategy

The Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions has agreed to launch a direct inquiry into whether former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was genuinely ill while staying on the 14th floor of the Police General Hospital in 2023 — a move that allowed him to avoid spending a single day in prison.

The court, which holds the authority to investigate the matter, has ordered Thaksin, along with the Bangkok Remand Prison Chief, the Director-General of the Department of Corrections, and the Chief Medical Officer of the Police General Hospital, to submit all relevant evidence within 30 days of receiving the court’s notice. A hearing has been scheduled for June 13.

This case has significant political implications. Previously, rumours swirled that Thaksin had directed his daughter, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, to initiate a Cabinet reshuffle. This sparked a flurry of behind-the-scenes deal-making, as political heavyweights — both in the spotlight and in the shadows — scrambled to secure or switch ministerial posts. There was even talk of a potential political rupture with the Bhumjaithai Party.

However, the legal proceedings over Thaksin’s hospital stay have forced him to pause his aggressive political plays and shift into a more defensive posture.

Political analysts — both supporters and critics — are now closely watching the court’s next move, predicting that the ruling may fall into one of only two possible directions, each with major implications for the broader political landscape.

The first potential outcome is one that plays into the hands of Thaksin’s supporters. They argue that opponents have repeatedly submitted petitions to both the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Political Office Holders and the Constitutional Court regarding this case, all of which have been dismissed.

Yet, the opposing camp remains persistent, continually refining its legal arguments and submitting fresh petitions. If the court fails to provide a clear ruling this time, critics warn it could invite an endless cycle of challenges and complaints.

“It’s worth noting that while the court previously dismissed Chanchai Issarasenarak’s petition, this time it has invoked its own authority to initiate proceedings,” said one source. “Some see this as a troubling escalation, but others believe the court may simply want to bring final clarity to the matter and prevent further legal wrangling.”

However, despite this potentially favourable framing, Thaksin’s situation remains precarious. Being placed under direct scrutiny by the court is far from safe. If the conservative establishment chooses to escalate or shift tactics, the consequences could be serious, particularly for Thaksin’s support base.

The second possible outcome benefits Thaksin’s critics, who believe his situation is heading back into the “red zone.” Under this scenario, the court is expected to demand comprehensive evidence and testimony from all individuals and state agencies involved to eliminate any doubts.

“The fact that the court is exercising its own authority to initiate an investigation is concerning for Thaksin,” a source explained. “Normally, unless there’s a strong indication of wrongdoing, the court wouldn’t take this step on its own. The weak point here is the optics: Thaksin returned to Thailand, entered prison, and suddenly suffered a critical illness. That timing raises questions.”

However, both scenarios remain purely speculative. Regardless of whether the court’s ruling favours or goes against Thaksin, since the case falls under a single-tier judicial system, its decision will be final and must be considered the end of the matter.

Thaksin’s future will inevitably have far-reaching implications for national politics, as he remains deeply intertwined with both the old and emerging centres of power.

The turning point for Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party came after the 2023 general election, when they made a strategic pivot by aligning with the conservative establishment to form a coalition government — a move that left their former temporary ally, the “Orange Camp,” in opposition.

Looking ahead to the 2030 election, regardless of Thaksin’s personal fate, the Pheu Thai Party is expected to remain a central force in the political equation.

Crucially, the conservative bloc currently lacks a party better positioned than Pheu Thai to counter the rising popularity of the “People’s Party,” which is gaining broader support than any other political group.

As a result, the conservative leadership still sees value in working with Thaksin and Pheu Thai. A full political break remains unlikely, as casting them aside could leave the conservatives without a viable political partner, and potentially strengthen the influence of the “Orange Wave,” which many in the establishment view as the greater threat.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the name "Thaksin" remains a deeply divisive figure — almost a political toxin — for the conservative bloc, which has long been locked in a fierce battle against him. The conservative network is multilayered and complex, with various factions and relationships extending across multiple levels of influence.

Since Pheu Thai’s strategic realignment to lead a coalition government alongside parties affiliated with the conservative network, key policies championed by the "Red Camp" have faced consistent resistance. These initiatives have been obstructed by the "Blue Network" and conservative forces, effectively stalling any major achievements of the government and rendering it largely ineffective.

Political analysts broadly agree that the brands “Thaksin,” “Shinawatra,” and “Pheu Thai” do not align with the core interests of the conservative establishment. However, they remain a necessary partner, used strategically to block the rise of the "Orange Machine," which is seen as a more formidable and existential threat.

A key reason the conservative leadership continues to rely on Thaksin is that no political party within the conservative bloc is yet strong enough to stand alone against the rising "Orange Wave."

While hopes may rest with the Bhumjaithai Party, it suffers from a critical weakness: a lack of broad-based public appeal. The 2023 general election results underscore this — the party won just 3 party-list MP seats and 68 constituency seats. This clearly reflects the strength of its local political networks, particularly the "political clans," but also highlights its limited national popularity.

To become a leading party in any future election, a political force needs both grassroots strength and momentum driven by popular sentiment. At present, Bhumjaithai lacks the mass appeal needed to represent the conservative network independently. As a result, the conservative bloc still finds itself needing the support of Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party to hold the political balance.

It is widely speculated that the conservative leadership has grown increasingly dissatisfied with Thaksin’s political manoeuvres on several occasions. It’s therefore no surprise that opposing factions — some long-time adversaries — have continued to apply pressure and stir controversy.

Sources say the conservative leadership’s core strategy may not be to turn Thaksin into a direct enemy or force a complete political split. Rather, their goal appears to be containment: to keep him operating within boundaries set by the conservative network, not overstepping or acting unilaterally in ways that disrupt the established order.

Going forward, the political dynamic between Thaksin and the conservative establishment bears close watching. The key question is whether they can find common ground. Both sides still rely on one another, borrowing each other's political power to stay afloat and govern effectively.