Three kingdoms of thai politics set the stage for government formation

The House of Representatives is now set to convene on September 3 to elect a new prime minister.

Yet behind the scenes, manoeuvring to form the next government remains chaotic. Bhumjaithai has launched its own bid to seize power, directly challenging Pheu Thai, which continues as caretaker government. 

The People’s Party, the largest bloc in parliament but without a prime ministerial candidate on its list, has emerged as the key variable. Its decision—to back either side or to abstain altogether—could determine whether a new government takes shape or whether politics resets entirely with fresh elections.

Amid this uncertainty, each camp has moved to secure the upper hand, not only for the upcoming prime ministerial vote but also with an eye to the possibility of a new general election. The People’s Party, by holding its cards close, has placed itself in a decisive position to alter the political scene at any moment.

Pheu Thai, anticipating the court’s ruling, had already prepared a contingency plan. The party hoped to retain its fragile coalition and put forward its final candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri, to succeed Paetongtarn. 

However, the strategy faltered when Bhumjaithai struck secret deals with some coalition partners, luring defectors to its “blue camp.” This move immediately derailed Pheu Thai’s chances of pushing its third candidate through.

The current equation is therefore defined by three main camps: the “orange camp” led by the People’s Party with 143 MPs (minus one defector), the “red camp” led by Pheu Thai with 140 MPs (also weakened by defections), and the “blue camp” led by Bhumjaithai with 69 MPs, bolstered by defectors.

The third camp holds the key to the new prime minister vote

The decisive factor lies with the “orange camp” of the People’s Party, which has formally declared its stance: it is ready to vote for a prime ministerial candidate from another party, but only on condition that the House is dissolved within four months and a constitutional referendum is held alongside the election. 

The party insists it will not join any government and will remain in opposition.

Bhumjaithai, the challenger, wasted no time. Its leader Anutin Charnvirakul launched an immediate campaign after the court’s ruling ousted Paetongtarn, making the People’s Party his first stop. Anutin pledged to accept all of the party’s conditions. 

At the same time, Bhumjaithai unveiled new allies: Santi Promphat of Palang Pracharath, Thamanat Prompow of Klatham, Suchart Chomklin representing the group of 18 MPs from United Thai Nation, as well as Pheu Thai “cobras” defecting to join the blue bloc.

This rapid attempt to forge a “blue–orange” deal propelled Anutin to the front line as the leading contender for Thailand’s next prime minister.

Pheu Thai, in contrast, pursued a more discreet approach. Its patriarch Thaksin Shinawatra reached out privately to Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, chairman of the Progressive Movement, seeking support for Pheu Thai’s candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri. 

The following day, on August 31, Pheu Thai leaders and coalition allies, including Phumtham Wechayachai, Sorawong Thienthong, Tawee Sodsong, Det-it Khaothong and Prapat Pothasuthon, met with People’s Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut to present their offer.

With both the blue and red camps placing proposals on the table, the People’s Party is set to decide its course of action at today’s meeting (September 1). 

Three options remain: back Pheu Thai for “Prime Minister Chaikasem”, back Bhumjaithai for “Prime Minister Anutin”, or withhold support from both, forcing the scenario towards dissolution and a fresh election.

Should it choose to support either camp, the next government will be bound by the People’s Party’s “four-month mission” timeline to dissolve parliament and drive constitutional reform. 

Yet the greater challenge lies in the political countdown itself—four months in which any camp must prepare for the inevitable election battle ahead.

“Red camp” pushes Senate collusion case and Khao Kradong land row

For Pheu Thai, the “red camp”, the four-month mission inevitably includes accelerating the Senate collusion case. 

This probe, now under investigation by both the Election Commission (EC) and the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), has already seen charges filed against figures linked to the “blue network”.

There is no denying that the “blue senators” remain the power base of the “blue camp”. Unless the red camp succeeds in dismantling this stronghold, it will remain a constant thorn in its side, leaving it vulnerable to political counter-attacks in the long term.

With senators empowered to appoint members of key independent bodies, their influence could decisively shape the political landscape.

The same urgency applies to the long-running Khao Kradong land dispute. After the Department of Lands at the Interior Ministry resolved to revoke the title deeds, the process now awaits the signature of department chief Khajornkiet Rakpanichmanee, expected to be completed by September.

The Khao Kradong site has long served as a strategic base for the “blue mentor” in consolidating his political domain. Should this command centre fall, the impact on the wider “blue network” would be unavoidable.

Together, these two issues form critical tasks for the red camp—challenges it must resolve swiftly if given the chance to move forward.

Pushing populist policies to pave way for election

For the red camp, another pressing task is to consolidate its personnel strategy in preparation for the next election. 

Having held the Interior Ministry portfolio for just over a month, Pheu Thai has already overseen high-level reshuffles. The next phase is likely to focus on provincial-level appointments, which could prove crucial in strengthening its electoral machinery.

Equally significant is the push to repackage populist policies as urgent measures to restore public confidence in the economy. Flagship initiatives include the 20-baht flat fare for electric trains, the retirement lottery, the “Homes for Thais” scheme, household debt relief, and expanded agricultural support.

Added to this is the immediate priority of handling the Cambodia border situation.

Pheu Thai aims to drive these programmes through quickly and decisively, in a bid to rally its traditional voter base and solidify support ahead of the next poll.

“Blue camp” seeks to freeze Khao Kradong and bury Senate collusion case

As the red camp works to dismantle the blue network, the blue camp’s power brokers are focused on regaining control—primarily to freeze the Khao Kradong land dispute and to overturn the Senate collusion case. Their aim is clear: to shield their political stronghold from being dismantled.

The blue camp’s political strategy relies heavily on wielding state power. Unlike a mass-movement party, its public image remains weak, and it must lean on government machinery to maintain influence. 

Its four-month mission, fronted by Anutin but guided from behind the scenes by Newin Chidchob, involves not only clearing its own legal hurdles but also reshaping the Interior Ministry. 

After a series of sweeping changes under the red camp, the blue bloc must reposition its allies at both senior and provincial levels.

Equally important is the cohesion of its coalition partners. Many parties within the bloc will need to stockpile political “ammunition” and resources in anticipation of the next election battle.

It is clear that the four-month timeline for both red and blue camps will not be about long-term economic planning. Instead, their focus will be short-term agendas within the limits of the current budget.

Any durable economic strategy will likely have to wait for the government formed after the next election.

Ultimately, the spotlight falls on today’s meeting of People’s Party MPs. The orange camp will set the course of events, leaving the fate of Thai politics hanging on the rivalry between three power figures: Thaksin Shinawatra, Newin Chidchob and Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit.