Thailand’s 2026 election heats up in high-stakes power fight

Thailand’s politics in 2026 is set for a heated and high-stakes year, with the February 8 general election framed as a decisive contest between an “old power network” and the liberal camp for control of government formation and the country’s direction.

The election outcome is expected to determine which political bloc voters place their hopes in. If the old network is able to retain control, its power structure could grow stronger than before, following a political realignment that toppled the Paetongtarn Shinawatra government and produced a minority administration led by “Noo” Anutin Charnvirakul, with various power brokers moving back towards the centre of influence.

If the old network fails to hold power, it could face heavy resistance and pressure, potentially forcing a reshuffle within the conservative leadership to stabilise its position.

The liberal camp also faces major stakes. In the 2023 election, the conservative camp was comparatively weak at the ballot box, allowing the former Move Forward Party and Pheu Thai to win nearly a parliamentary majority between them. That outcome pushed conservative forces into a deal with Thaksin Shinawatra that enabled Pheu Thai to form a government — before it was later brought down. A similar pattern is described for the People’s Party, which at one point held strong leverage but voted to support Anutin for prime minister, before being “betrayed” as the constitutional amendment agenda collapsed and parliament was dissolved, resetting the political chessboard.

Both the People’s Party and Pheu Thai are portrayed as having been targeted by a deeper conservative strategy that hit their political popularity. Combined with a nationalist mood linked to the Thailand–Cambodia border situation, conservative forces are described as regaining strength, particularly Bhumjaithai.

Coalition maths after the vote

Attention is expected to shift immediately after ballots close on February 8, 2026, when vote totals should clarify coalition possibilities. Three main blocs and three parties are expected to dominate the equation, with government formation possibly coming down to three major “formulas”.

Formula 1: Bhumjaithai + Pheu Thai

Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai could form the core, then add coalition partners to reach a working majority, with Kla Tham and the Democrat Party cited as likely targets. This formula is described as relatively likely because power would remain with the old bloc, but with Bhumjaithai taking the lead role instead of Pheu Thai — seen as a way to limit “Thaksin-style” political influence, which conservative leaders are portrayed as unwilling to accept.

Formula 2: Bhumjaithai + People’s Party

Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party could also form the core, despite earlier statements by People’s Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut that he would not support Anutin a second time, and Anutin’s stance against parties backing amendments to Section 112 of the Criminal Code. Both sides later softened their tone, the article notes.

If this alignment took shape, the Democrat Party would be more likely to be invited, as the People’s Party and Democrats have both said they will not partner with Kla Tham. However, the piece argues such a deal remains unlikely because conservative power brokers do not trust the “orange network” with power, even briefly.

Formula 3: People’s Party + Pheu Thai

A People’s Party–Pheu Thai coalition is also presented as possible despite a bitter past and broken agreements, with continued links at the level of “spiritual leaders”. The key constraint for Pheu Thai is Thaksin, the article argues.

Referendum on the 2017 constitution

On February 8, voters are also set to decide whether Thailand should have a new constitution to replace the 2017 charter. A special cabinet meeting approved holding a referendum with the question: “Do you agree that Thailand should have a new constitution?”

Approval would require a majority of those voting, and the “yes” vote must also exceed the number of people choosing “no opinion”. If both conditions are met, the Election Commission would forward the result to the new cabinet.

The new cabinet would then send the matter to parliament to consider amending Section 256 of the 2017 constitution to open a path for drafting changes, including decisions on the method.

However, the article notes an existing obstacle: the Senate’s one-third threshold, which has previously caused attempts to amend Section 256 — including efforts by the People’s Party — to fail. As a result, constitutional change is expected to become a major flashpoint, with “blue networks” portrayed as controlling the game in parliament. Any revised charter could be seen as a “deep blue constitution” rather than a fully new settlement, the article suggests.

Section 112 case hangs over Thaksin

Thaksin Shinawatra is described as still facing political hardship, including uncertainty over his release date from Klong Prem Central Prison after returning to serve a sentence linked to the “fake illness” case involving treatment on the 14th floor of the Police General Hospital on September 9, 2025.

The piece says Thaksin has not been reclassified into a higher prisoner category, meaning he does not qualify for a general early release programme after serving six months, which could delay parole consideration.

A further constraint is the Section 112 case. Although the trial court dismissed the case, it relates to a 2015 interview given in Seoul, South Korea, allegedly referring to the institution. The attorney-general, Itthiporn Kaewthip, has ordered an appeal, arguing the act amounts to an offence, even though an internal review committee reportedly voted 8–2 against appealing. The article says attention now turns to how prosecutors proceed and whether Thaksin’s lawyers can help him avoid further risk.

Fate of 44 former Move Forward MPs

The “orange network” is also said to face risk from the unresolved case involving 44 former Move Forward MPs linked to a proposal to amend Section 112. The National Anti-Corruption Commission has completed the investigation file, with reports suggesting a decision to indict all 44. However, requests for fairness filed by some former MPs have delayed a decision by the full NACC board, with an outcome expected in early 2026.

Fourteen of the 44 have been nominated by the People’s Party as election candidates: 12 on the party list — including Natthaphong and Sirikanya Tansakul — and two as constituency candidates, Thirachai Phanthumas in Bangkok and Jaras Khumkhainam in Chonburi.

Many are described as leading figures who shape party direction and parliamentary work. If all 14 were forced to lose MP status and potentially face political bans, the impact on the People’s Party would be unavoidable, the article argues.

Overall, 2026 is portrayed as a year of major political stakes: whether Thailand enters a period of change, or whether the same power networks remain dominant. Voters, the piece concludes, will deliver their answer on February 8, 2026.