EC explains barcode issue: A safeguard against ballot fraud, insists election secrecy upheld

The Election Commission (EC) addressed the controversy surrounding the “barcode” on ballots, clarifying that it is used for verification purposes to prevent ballot mismatching and fraud. The EC stressed that the secrecy of the election remains intact, and it does not violate the constitution. The barcode is part of measures to ensure a fair and transparent election process.

On February 13, 2026, at 14:00, the EC's spokesperson team, led by Kanchit Charoenin, Deputy Secretary-General of the EC, along with Acting Lt. Pasakorn Siripakayaporn, Deputy Secretary-General of the EC, Kittipol Phayakkadechapun, Director of the Information Technology Office, and Worapong Ananchareonkij, Director of the Election Support Office, held a press conference on the general election and referendum at the Election Commission's office.

Pasakorn Siripakayaporn, Deputy Secretary-General of the EC, explained that the appearance of a “barcode” on party-list ballots raised concerns that voters' selections could be known after voting. He clarified the voting process to alleviate this concern: First, voters check their name on the list and sign. Then, they sign the ballot stub before the Election Officials (E.O.) tear off the stub and hand over the ballot.

He pointed out that when entering the voting booth, no one else can see what the voter chooses; this is a private right. The voter alone knows who they are voting for, as the process is conducted in secrecy within the booth.

Additionally, the law explicitly prohibits voters from showing their marked ballots to others or taking photos of their ballots after voting. Violating these rules is a criminal offense and could result in the revocation of voting rights. He reassured the public that if the process is followed correctly—voting privately and individually—such issues would not occur.

After leaving the voting booth, voters must personally drop their ballots into the ballot box. No one else can do it for them. The process proceeds as follows: Once voting closes at 17:00, the ballot counting begins. Ballots of unknown origin are mixed in the box. The E.O.s then retrieve the ballots and start the counting process, but they do not know which ballot belongs to whom, as the stubs are already separated.

Once the counting is complete, the ballots are placed in clear plastic bags, which are then segregated into bags for valid ballots, invalid ballots, and ballots with no votes. These bags are sealed with straps, and no one can open them. After everything is securely packed, the bags are placed in larger bags, which are sealed with a strap.

Pasakorn continued, stating that all documents must be placed in outer transparent bags and properly sealed. Once sealed, the bags are locked with a strap. This process applies to all types of ballot boxes, whether for party-list or constituency elections. Once the ballots are packed, they are placed in a final ballot box, which is then sealed with tape and straps.

Each ballot box from the polling units will be sent to the central tallying center or the election coordination center of each district to undergo the process of consolidating the ballots, as seen in the case of Chonburi. Once they arrive, the district subcommittee will take all the ballot boxes from its respective polling units, sort the ballots, and consolidate them by cutting the straps. The ballots are then placed into bags without opening any straps from the bags. The bags are simply picked up and transferred into one ballot box, which is then filled. Once this consolidation process is completed, the ballot stubs and voter lists are separately stored for safekeeping.

The voter lists must be submitted to the district or local registrar to record those who did not exercise their voting rights, and these individuals will be restricted from voting in the future.

Once the ballot consolidation is complete, the sealed ballot boxes are stored in a secure location, such as a police station, district office, or provincial EC office, for up to two years. They are kept there until the period for complaints and objections expires, after which the ballots can be destroyed. During this storage period, no one is allowed to open the sealed ballot boxes, and they can only be opened if a new vote count is ordered. This is part of the security process designed to ensure that the elections remain confidential, in accordance with Section 85 of the Constitution.

“If you have doubts that this process allows us to trace the origin of the ballots, as reported in the news, let me clarify. Even if you scan the barcode, there are three components to consider: 1. The ballot stub, which has already been stored separately, and 2. The voter list, which has been submitted to the registrar to record those who did not vote. These components, among others, will prevent anyone from tracing the ballots back to individual voters. I want to make it clear that the barcode system is in place for specific purposes, and I assure you that every step of the voting process, from entry to casting your ballot, is conducted in full confidentiality, as required by the Constitution,” said Pasakorn.

Confirmation of Barcode Implementation: Tracking to Prevent Ballot Fraud and Forgery

Worapong Ananchareonkij, Director of the Election Support Bureau, addressed the recent controversy regarding the use of barcodes on ballots. He explained that the implementation of barcodes stems from legal regulations outlined in the EC’s Election Act, specifically Clause 129, which grants the EC the authority to add special markings or codes to the ballots without prior notice. This is done to prevent forgery.

He emphasized that the barcode serves not only to prevent ballot forgery but also as part of a broader set of measures designed to ensure election integrity. These anti-forgery measures are confidential and cannot be disclosed. The barcode is a tool for managing and controlling the election process, ensuring that it remains fair and transparent.

For example, the printing process involves assigning unique barcodes to track the quantity and verify whether the number of ballots printed exceeds the allowable limit. Additionally, during the binding and packaging stages, these barcodes are used to confirm the correct number of ballots. Each ballot booklet, containing 20 ballots, is checked through these barcodes to ensure that the count is accurate and that no issues arise, such as the occurrence of extra ballots, ensuring the integrity of the voting process.

Worapong explained that beyond the production process, the distribution of ballots is also closely monitored. Those responsible within the EC or district EC offices are tasked with ensuring that once the ballots are distributed, any potential issues, such as ballots being leaked outside, can be traced. Using the barcode, the EC can determine who was responsible for distributing a specific ballot and track any potential misconduct.

He further clarified that the barcode system also helps with the detection of fraud, such as the use of counterfeit ballots or the use of ballots across districts or polling units. For example, in cases where images of ballots with attached stubs are shared on social media, the barcode allows for the identification of the ballot's number. This enables the EC to track where the ballot originated, showing that the ballot had not yet been detached from its booklet and must have been in the possession of someone responsible for managing it. This is part of the fact-checking process for verifying the integrity of the election and addressing any concerns regarding the use of barcodes.

Ensuring Election Integrity, Not Compromising Secrecy

Worapong emphasized that the barcode system is solely used to ensure the integrity of the election process, not to compromise the confidentiality of voters. Contrary to what was reported in the news, the barcode is not used to trace back to a voter’s specific choice. He reassured that at every stage of the voting process, there is no opportunity for others to know who a voter has chosen. Even if images of ballots with barcodes are shared, revealing numbers or codes does not prove who cast the vote.

Strict Measures for Secure Ballot Storage

He also explained the final process of storing and securing the ballots. Ballots are carefully segregated and stored securely. The ballots and their corresponding stubs are stored separately in a highly controlled environment, ensuring their safety. He expressed confidence that once ballots were cast on February 8, it would be impossible to identify which candidate or political party a voter had selected.

Secrecy of the Vote Guaranteed

Furthermore, Pasakorn added that no one, not even the EC, can access the sealed ballot boxes after the election. The EC can only open the boxes if a recount is ordered. He reassured the public that the election process held on February 1 and February 8 was conducted according to the Constitution, ensuring the secrecy of the vote.

On the Use of Barcodes in Referendums

When asked why barcodes were not used in the referendum ballots, Worapong explained that there are three different types of ballots, and the printing of these ballots involved three different printing houses. Each printing house follows different procedures and technologies, meaning the measures for preventing fraud differ from one printer to another. He confirmed that although referendum ballots did not have barcodes, they were still traceable, though the tracking methods used are confidential and cannot be disclosed.

On the Lack of Barcodes on Sample Ballots

When asked why the sample ballots did not have barcodes and why the public wasn't informed about this in advance, Worapong clarified that sample ballots serve two purposes: to inform the public about the ballot format and to demonstrate the barcode system, which is part of the security measures. Since the sample ballots are not used in the actual voting process, it is not possible to apply the barcode system to them.

Reaffirming the Secrecy of the Election

Worapong reaffirmed that the election process remains in full compliance with the Constitution and maintains voter secrecy as required by Section 85. He referenced Section 96 of the Election Act, which prohibits anyone from marking their ballot in a way that could identify their vote. He explained that the EC has the authority to implement security measures, including barcodes, to prevent ballot fraud, and these measures are in line with the constitutional mandate for secret voting.

Barcode and its Role in Tracking Votes

When asked whether the barcode could be used to trace a ballot back to an individual, Worapong explained that although scanning a barcode might display a unique number, the election process ensures that no one can know how a voter voted. He reiterated that the entire voting procedure is designed to ensure confidentiality. After the ballots are cast, counted, and securely stored, no one, including the EC, can access the details of the vote.

Constitutionality of the Barcode System

Finally, when questioned if the barcode system might violate the Constitution, Pasakorn emphasized that the essence of secret voting is that no one can know how a voter casts their ballot. He reassured the public that the system in place fully adheres to the constitutional requirement for secret voting.

On Tracing Ballots Back to Voters Using Barcodes

When asked if the barcode system could trace a ballot back to the voter by matching the stub and barcode, Worapong  explained that the process of storing ballot stubs is highly secure. In each election district, there are approximately 250 polling units, and in some provinces, there could be thousands of units. Given the volume, it is extremely difficult to trace or retrieve information about an individual’s vote. If someone attempted to open the ballot box illegally, it would be considered a criminal act.

The press repeatedly asked whether the process could trace a vote back to the person who cast it. Worapong did not directly answer the question but emphasized that, once the ballots are securely stored after being counted, there is no way for anyone to trace which ballot belongs to which voter. Both the EC and provincial offices have strict measures in place to protect the secrecy of the votes, and if anyone were to violate these protocols, they would face legal consequences, regardless of whether they are EC staff or provincial employees.

Security of Ballot Boxes

He further clarified that no one is allowed to open the sealed ballot boxes unless the EC issues a formal order for a recount or new election. There are strict disciplinary measures to ensure that no one manipulates the ballots. Any individual found guilty of compromising the integrity of the election will face legal penalties.

Regarding the Barcode Leak on Social Media

Addressing concerns about the barcode leak on social media, Worapong reassured that the numbers visible from the barcode do not allow anyone to identify the voter. The numbers may only reveal the ballot's number, but they cannot be linked back to an individual voter.

On the Use of Barcodes for Tracking and Preventing Fraud

Worapong explained that the use of barcodes is primarily to prevent fraud and to track any potential ballot tampering. He clarified that although other methods and technologies exist, the decision to use barcodes was based on the printing technology available at the time. The printing process has strict time constraints, and each printing house uses its own technology, which influences the decision to adopt barcodes. Some printing houses may not be familiar with other methods, but the barcode system ensures transparency and the ability to track ballots in a way that aligns with the need for integrity.

Concerns Over Leaked Ballots and Barcode Use

Regarding concerns about ballots with barcodes being shared on social media, Worapong explained that the ballots in the images were still intact and had not been marked, meaning they were not yet used. He also noted that the display of such images does not constitute a legal violation unless the ballots were actually marked or used inappropriately. Furthermore, it is acceptable for election officials to show the ballot to observers for transparency.

International Practices and Security Measures

When asked why barcodes were not used on referendum ballots, Worapong stated that although the referendum ballots did not have barcodes, there were still other measures in place to prevent fraud. However, he added that revealing these security methods would make them vulnerable to exploitation. The decision to use barcodes or QR codes depends on the printing houses' technologies, and while other countries may use similar systems, they might not always employ barcodes or QR codes in the same way.

Tracking Ballots and Election Integrity

Worapong also explained that the barcode system allows the EC to track ballots, especially in cases of fraud, such as using a ballot across different districts or polling units. When a ballot is scanned, the EC can verify whether it was assigned to the correct district. If a ballot is found to be from a different district, it would indicate a problem, but such incidents have not occurred in previous elections.

No Risk of Creating Big Data

Regarding the ballots, which are separated into three parts: the stub, the ballot itself, and the voter list, Worapong addressed concerns about the possibility of the information turning into "big data" for tracking voters. He explained that after two years, the ballots will be destroyed in accordance with the EC's approval. The EC determines the method of destruction, ensuring that the ballots are not accessible or retrievable. Therefore, there is no possibility of the ballots becoming part of any "big data" system, as no one will be able to access them.

Response to the Complaint on Ballot Stubs and Confidentiality

In response to a complaint from Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn who questioned whether it would be possible to check whether the ballot stubs match the barcode and whether the confidentiality of voters is at risk, Pasakorn confirmed that the ballot stub and the actual ballot are kept separately. The ballot stubs are stored separately, while the marked ballots are placed in the ballot box and securely stored. There is no possibility of cross-checking them, except in cases of fraud or violations of the law, which would then be investigated according to the facts.

This process is designed to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the election, ensuring that no one can check or match ballots back to voters unless there is clear evidence of misconduct.