The means by which members of parliament are chosen have in recent times been a key element of every attempt at constitutional reform, resulting in policy shifts back and forth, each ostensibly designed to rid elections of the potential for manipulation.
The 1997 charter, for example, trimmed constituency representation from three seats to one. The 2007 constitution restored three-seat constituencies. At other times, markers such as the candidates’ level of education were examined as possible screening factors. Would-be reformers have debated whether the prime minister wields too much power over elected politicians or whether the parliamentary system itself allows self-serving politicians to hold the prime minister to ransom.
The effort to “clean up” the election process, however, has always focused on form more than substance, and we have yet to see a system put in place that has improved the quality of our elected representatives. On the contrary, unsuitable politicians consistently manage to be re-elected and promising newcomers turn out to be willingly corrupted.
The authors of our most recently rejected charter draft had in mind a mixed proportional electoral system that they felt would enable more parties to share seats in the House of Representatives. They wanted every citizen’s vote to count, so they lowered the ceiling on the number of designated party-list MPs.
Now there’s another idea afloat, again a mixture of constituency MPs and party-list MPs, but this time giving voters just one choice on the ballot. The radically different angle this time, though, is that the votes received by failed candidates would help determine how many party-list MPs each party can designate. In other words, even the votes cast for constituency candidates who fail to get elected would still count in the party-list category. The concept seems likely to be rejected – it’s been broadly criticised, the detractors sure it’s a ploy to tilt the parliamentary balance.
If the number of constituency MPs far outweighed that of party-list MPs, say a 4:1 ratio, the proposal would have little impact on representation. But if the numbers are equal or nearly so, it could greatly aid the party that wins the most constituency seats – to the critics that means the Democrat Party, the perennial runner-up in recent decades – while undermining the representative strength of the Pheu Thai Party, which has won every recent election it has contested.
The coin has two sides. The proposed system would appear to be fair to both sides if either party garners wide support in some constituencies yet loses the election by a small margin – it would prevent all those votes from “going to waste”. On the other hand, a substantial victory margin in most constituencies and in the overall election would be dampened by the recognition of the few votes cast for the loser, whose significance would be greatly enhanced in parliamentary representation.
In response to the backlash, the drafting committee is now suggesting that all the winning party’s votes be calculated into the equation as well, yet it is mulling a method of calculation that would still add greater weight to the losing party’s votes.
This latest round of wrangling is sure to continue, as ever a battle of form over substance. As ever, the quality of the candidates is being ignored. Focusing on what votes should count and by what calculus, the constitutional scribes have yet to find a way to screen out the bad seeds.
Let’s look beyond the apparatus of elections. The charter should contain a mechanism that admits only candidates who are genuinely loyal to the interests of the nation and the people. We need progressive, dignified and patriotic representatives, guided and overseen by a constitution that brooks no self-serving or unethical practice.