Kriengsak Kovadhana, senior vice president of ITD, stated on Friday that the company, as part of the ITD-CREC Joint Venture, had been contracted by the SAO and had followed the construction plans accordingly. He confirmed that the construction process underwent rigorous inspections.
“There was no reason for us to use substandard materials,” he said, adding that all documents submitted for approval by the joint venture were complete and vetted by supervising engineers and the materials acceptance committee, thereby affirming the company's integrity.
Regarding design plan changes, Kriengsak explained that ITD adhered strictly to the construction contract. Any plan revisions originated from the project designers and the client.
Asked whether the company was aware of the changes, Kriengsak said, “Of course, we knew they requested changes. But whether the revised plans were structurally sound—that’s not for us to determine.”
“You have to understand this is a 30-storey building. Any single change must be evaluated in the context of the whole structure,” he said, “Reviewing blueprints and saying whether it’s safe or not is not the contractor’s responsibility. Nor do we have the capability to make that judgement.”
He acknowledged that there were nine separate plan revisions, noting that each one was discussed in meetings and followed by formal written instructions to ITD.
He confirmed that the reduction in the thickness of the lift shaft wall, for instance, was not a result of collusion to reduce the contractor’s workload for personal gain, but rather a modification to comply with government requirements.
This project had numerous conflicting designs—structural, architectural, systems and interior, he added.
Kriengsak noted that he had issued over 700 formal queries to supervising engineers regarding these design conflicts. We couldn’t proceed without clarification because the plans contradicted one another, he said.
When asked specifically about the elevator shaft, he explained that at the time, the walkway between shafts did not comply with legal width requirements. This issue was raised during meetings to determine how to proceed.
He also pointed out that the SAO building, being a government facility, was not required to obtain a construction permit from the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), only to notify them. He emphasised that despite multiple design changes, the original material specifications—steel, concrete, etc.—remained unchanged.
He further explained that in dealing with the elevator shaft issue, PKW Joint Venture, as the project supervisor, first sought comment from the project designer before submitting the issue to the project inspection committee. Once consensus was reached to follow the designer’s recommendation, instructions were formally issued to ITD for implementation.
When asked whether safety issues related to the revised plans were discussed in meetings, Kriengsak said he may not have been present at the time. In any case, the designer is responsible for safety considerations, he said. If the designer confirmed the changes were safe, ITD proceeded accordingly.
He stressed that all procedures were carried out correctly and in full compliance with protocol. Regarding allegations of signature forgery, he stated that the company had no knowledge of such incidents, as verifying signatures was not within their remit.
However, Kriengsak did not clarify whether such plan discrepancies were common practice. At the time, representatives from China Railway Number 10, part of the ITD-CREC Joint Venture, had taken him to present compensation to families affected by the building’s collapse.