Pheu Thai faces overhaul after election rout; coalition in play

One turning point behind Pheu Thai becoming a party with fewer than 100 MPs, and losing its long-held dominance in the Northeast and North, is something many within the red camp acknowledge: the Shinawatra brand has weakened. They attribute this to missteps in strategy by red-camp “air-conditioned war-room” strategists, as well as nationalist sentiment—particularly the issue that many Thais have not forgotten: the “Uncle audio clip”.

The appearance of Paetongtarn Shinawatra, a former prime minister, at several major Pheu Thai events during the final stretch of the campaign led some candidates in the Northeast to comment that the “young boss” only reinforced public memories of the audio clip involving a conversation with Hun Sen, Cambodia’s Senate President—an especially sensitive issue for people living along the border in the lower Northeast.

Another major factor was Pheu Thai’s sweeping loss in the Shinawatra “capital” of Chiang Mai, where it was hit hard by the orange-wave storm and green momentum—ending up with not a single red MP in Chiang Mai. This was described as the party’s worst performance since Thai Rak Thai was founded in 1998.

In every general election, “the Shinawatra side” has never missed its Chiang Mai MP target, as it is the family’s home province. But the 8 February 2026 election was not only the first time this happened; it was also an aftershock of warning signs seen as far back as the 2019 election, when the orange party broke into Chiang Mai with one seat, and then in the 2023 election, when Pheu Thai narrowly held on with two Chiang Mai seats.

Meanwhile, provinces in the North that had previously seen “red sweep” outcomes in 2023 did not see any red province-wide sweeps in 2026.

Pheu Thai has tried to draw lessons repeatedly since falling into opposition, using the slogan “Overhaul Thailand—Pheu Thai can do it”, and positioning Dr Yodchanan Wongsawat, a third-generation Shinawatra figure, as its prime ministerial candidate after earlier Shinawatra generations.

The 2026 campaign strategy was said to have come from a group of thinkers who had never practised through real elections—strategists close to the Shinawatra family—leaving “red ratings” unable to recover to their earlier position of securing at least 100 MPs.

A Pheu Thai source said this election involved far greater use of capital and “all-out resources” than ever before, and claimed that the blue and green networks—together winning around 250 MPs—spent no less than tens of billions of baht. In some constituencies, the source alleged spending was as high as 80–100 million baht per seat.

The red camp also increased its resources, the source said—doubling from a previous level of a little over 3 billion baht to about 6 billion baht this time. In some constituencies, the source claimed spending on rally stages and transport costs alone was no less than 2–3 million baht. Even so, the source said, despite investing more, the red camp could not withstand the far greater resources of the current ruling side.

“This election will further encourage massive recouping of investments if Pheu Thai joins a government with Bhumjaithai. You can start the countdown—the government will not last more than two years. There will be bargaining and investment. Once inside, there will be more demands for projects, and it will create internal conflict within the government. If Pheu Thai joins, even now we still believe the party’s financiers want to be in government. Even if they do not gain political points, they get budget. Next time, be careful—the party could fall below 20 seats,” the Pheu Thai source said.

However, based on the political arithmetic from the unofficial results, Pheu Thai finished third, winning 58 constituency seats and 16 party-list seats, for a total of 74 MPs. If it were to join a government led by Bhumjaithai with 193 seats, with Kla Tham also in the equation with 58 seats, the coalition would total 325 MPs. It would be a strong government, but bargaining power within the cabinet would persist.

That is because there are “swing parties” in the mix—Pheu Thai and Kla Tham—able to negotiate for “Grade A” ministries they are determined to secure, even though Bhumjaithai would already hold many of the top portfolios.

“Bhumjaithai” would have no fewer than 21 ministerial posts, plus the Speaker of the House. Pheu Thai, if it joins, is expected to receive around eight ministerial posts, along with the First Deputy Speaker of the House. Kla Tham would receive fewer, at around six ministerial posts.

At the same time, there is also a possibility that one faction between the red and green camps may not go together—meaning one group would certainly end up in opposition. It is seen as highly likely that the “blue” camp will join hands with Kla Tham, but given a political context in which support is not yet fully consolidated, the formula of bringing Pheu Thai into the coalition to reduce bargaining pressure from smaller parties still remains possible.

But the risk factor is the working style of the “Captain” party, which is ready to break with those in power at any time—evidenced by past splits with “Uncle Tu”, then “Uncle Pom”, and even reaching Thaksin Shinawatra.

In this context, “Kru Yai” Newin Chidchob must calculate the political arithmetic carefully: choosing “red” or “green” as coalition partners—whichever formula allows Anutin to secure a second term as prime minister and stay in office for at least close to four years.

With his experience and toughness, “Kru Yai” is both an operator and the strategist who plots moves for the blue party. He is expected to know the political blind spots and prevent the blue camp from stumbling—seen in the results of deploying resources to target and win MPs across the North, Central region and Northeast, leaving the Shinawatra side with no room to stand politically.

Turning to the scenario in which Pheu Thai must be in opposition, it is certain that two “S.” figures in the party who are financiers in the red camp would disagree with such a formula. A portion of MPs in the wing of these two “S.” figures are separate from the “true red” Pheu Thai MPs. People within Pheu Thai still believe that sitting on the opposition benches would allow the party to accumulate political points, but the financier faction could become uncomfortable.

But if Pheu Thai and “those with power in the red camp” accept an invitation to join Anutin’s government, there is a path forward—yet the party could become one waiting to fall below 70 seats in the future, no longer a party with the chance to lead the formation of government again.

At the same time, attention is on Pheu Thai’s planned party general meeting on Friday, 13 February 2026, for which the party has called candidates from every region to attend at Pheu Thai headquarters.

A major post-election review is expected, although some candidates have complained that there is no need to repeat the same lesson-drawing exercise again.

The heavy-spending model in the Northeast did not send signals only in the 2026 election. The political-business dynamic of massive capital deployment was tested in 2023, as seen in the steady rise of the blue party—from under 50 seats, to a mid-sized party, and now to a major party.

In many Northeast constituencies that were once red strongholds, former red-camp MPs had warned senior Pheu Thai figures to watch out for heavy resource deployment in the next election.

And it came true. On 8 February 2026, Pheu Thai’s camp was breached and collapsed in many constituencies. The Shinawatra aura faded; the Shinawatra brand no longer worked; Pheu Thai could not sell its flagship “strength” policies; and “Yodchanan can’t do it” in this era.

The party lost both the overall election crown and its long-held championships in the Northeast and North—Pheu Thai’s base since 2001.

An “overhaul of Pheu Thai” can no longer be just a campaign slogan. It must become a real overhaul—right now—for the air-conditioned war-room strategists in the red faction, to prevent the party from declining further.