The politicisation of the modern bureaucracy: Say you'll dance
My father was a bureaucrat who saw himself as a civil/public servant who by definition works strictly for the public interest. He was at the time, the most educated civil servant at his ministry, with law degrees both at home and abroad. He was also the m
Those powers that be did not hate him because he was a genuinely nice and likeable man, but he was not wanted. So, after putting him in "the freezer" for a while, they moved him around the ministry to get him out of their way. To the very end, my father kept his pride and dignity by always doing his job right, no matter how insignificant it was, in the name of the public interest, neutrally, impartially and anonymously.
He was the reason I swore I would never join the government. I am not even half as decent, patient and dignified a person as my father was. The first English-language book my father taught me to read was the abridged "Uncle Tom's Cabin." From it I learned to deplore to the bone any injustice.
If my father were alive today, I would have asked him to share his wisdom about the increasin politicisation of the bureaucracy, to an extent and depth unseen and unheard of, and perhaps unimaginable, during his day.
Every day these days there are news stories about the reshuffling/removal of high-ranking government officials. Nobody except one makes an issue out of it. It has become a fact of life that bureaucrats have to accept. Policy-makers naturally want to have sympathetic courtiers to implement or carry out their policies. As much as power is, of essence, in politics, politicians can become inadequate if they have to fight with a bureaucracy that has allegiance to another political boss.
The politicisation of the bureaucracy in Thailand did not just start recently. It has been on the rise since the 1980s and has intensified over the last decade. Today, it seems that the entire bureaucracy of the country is duty bound to the political hierarchy of the government of the day. With each change of government after an election victory, the top-tier civil servants in the outgoing government expect to be sent to "Siberia", and political appointments to suit the new political masters are made. Who says the term "binge and purge" applies only in eating disorders?
The balance between political appointees and career bureaucrats in government is the fundamental question of who shall rule. In the western European democracies of France, Britain and Germany, only 100 or so new political appointees to each new administration are allowed. In the US, the new administration fills thousands of positions with its own appointees. Recent presidents have come into office with distrust and hostility toward the career bureaucracy, and therefore have increased the number of political appointees to ensure control over this perceived problem. The result is the so-called "consensual governance" and the "cycle of accommodation".
In the end, this practice and mindset benefits no one. It weakens the capacity of the political office-holders and undermines the effectiveness and morale of the administration.
Mistrust and control have become a dominant factor within the political realm around the world. Politicians come and go, although some manage to hang around for quite some time, but the bureaucracy in any country is regarded as permanent government. When political influence and interference in bureaucratic affairs rises to a certain extent, the institution of the civil service is bound to crumble. In any country, bureaucracy is a prerequisite of development, as it constitutes the apparatus and mechanism though which the state realises its purposes. The politicisation of the bureaucracy marginalises the institution and leads to the organisational imbalance that adversely affects the quality of governance.
Max Weber (1864-1920), arguably the foremost social theorist of the 20th century, advocates a strict dichotomy of politics and administration - a neat division of labour - and opposes any political role for civil servants. Politicians formulate the policies, he contends, and bureaucrats execute them. He also stresses that a bureaucrat must implement the policies faithfully, whatever the decision, and be anonymous and neutral in the discharge of that duty.
The doctrine of neutrality and anonymity is one of the tenets of the Weberian model of bureaucracy that aims to insulate the bureaucrat from any politicisation, and allows him to be professional in his outlook.
But reality has rendered Weberianism outdated; the strict dichotomy cannot be maintained. The quality and values of both politicians and bureaucrats have declined and the word "corrupt" dominates the political realm, as, at the same time, "inefficient" and "stumbling block in the nation's progress" are the top descriptions of the bureaucracy.
The former prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, advocated the concept of a "committed bureaucracy" comprising an administrative cadre committed to national objectives and responsive to its social needs. But again, man has a knack of turning a good concept into bad deeds. Gandhi's committed bureaucrats turned into a breed of pliable civil servant who would always say "Yes, Minister" and would be ready to crawl when asked to bend to their political masters' will.
The question of collision or collusion between the political executive and the bureaucracy may never be universally and satisfactorily resolved. Meanwhile, in Thailand, and many other places around the world, political masters have many means of coercion, overt and covert, to dictate the tune, and those bureaucrats who do not dance to it have to learn to face transfer, disguised demotion or compulsory retirement. Pride and dignity goes out the door.
It is a sad and unrhythmic tune to which some must dance, with a bleeding heart and smiling face, consensually.
