Getting to the bottom of the N Korea-Myanmar connection

The time is now to ask – and have answered – some critical questions of Myanmar’s leaders as the world increasingly engages with the nation once known as Burma. 

With Myanmar scheduled to take over the rotating leadership of Asean next year, there will no doubt be growing expectations for the nation to become a responsible stakeholder in and contributor to a more peaceful and prosperous region. 

Understandably, many of the civil society organisations and nations who once pushed for sanctions on Myanmar continue to ask questions and press for concrete answers and reforms on a number of human rights issues even as they acknowledge progress on a range of economic and political fronts. Less attention though has been given by policymakers to the issue of Myanmar’s past and present military relationship with North Korea. 

That should change given the unpredictable North Korean state’s potential to destabilise the region and hinder Asia’s continued economic progress.

Even as investments by US, Japanese and European companies in the once pariah state of Myanmar are on the rise, it is worth asking questions about how much has really changed since the days of military rule when it comes to the nation’s relationship with the still pariah state of North Korea.

In a recent speech before the Heritage Foundation here in Washington, Keith Luse, a respected former senior US Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member, called for greater transparency in Myanmar’s dealings with North Korea. 

He also, in expressing his personal opinion, posed a number of questions that are well worth repeating and that policymakers also interested in a peaceful, prosperous Asia-Pacific region should also seek answers to. 

Here is Luse’s list of 10 key questions:

1. What is the complete list of the multiple military and other projects where North Korean technicians and officials have been present or working inside Myanmar during the last 13 years?

2. Which of the projects or facilities, where North Koreans have been or are present, have or had a role in the development of Myanmar’s missile programme, nuclear programme or both?

3. What has been the role of North Korean trading companies in the development of Myanmar’s nuclear and missile programmes? These same companies have reportedly assisted Syria with the development of its nuclear programme.

4. To what degree has China’s complicity with the major expansion of the North Korea-Myanmar military relationship been raised with the Chinese by the United States, the European Union and others in the international community? In recent years, North Korean technicians and workers have entered Myanmar via Chinese flights originating in China, according to Luse, and a considerable amount of military equipment and weaponry supplied by North Korea has entered Myanmar overland through China. 

5. What has been or is China’s direct role, officially and unofficially, in the development of Myanmar’s nuclear and missile programmes? North Korean state trading companies’ Chinese partners may well play a role in assisting Myanmar’s nuclear and missile development. In contrast, Luse notes, Russia has been transparent in reporting much of its role in the development of Myanmar’s nuclear programme. 

6. What is the complete list of countries that have, knowingly or unknowingly, assisted Myanmar with development of its nuclear or missile programmes? It will be interesting to see which, if any, Asian nations, due to dual-use technology, are on this list.

7. To what degree has North Korea’s aiding and expanding of Myanmar’s military capabilities been raised with North Korea by the United States, the European Union and others in the international community?

8. What is the full inventory of military equipment and weapons, whether submarines or defence radar systems, provided or planned on being provided by North Korea to Myanmar?

9. Has the presence of multiple North Korean trading companies within Myanmar established another front and route for North Korea’s global proliferation capabilities? 

10. And critically, amidst growing engagement with much of the world, why are Myanmar’s leaders waffling on terminating, and making transparent and clear such termination of, the military relationship with North Korea?  

Perhaps, Luse states, Myanmar’s leaders now believe that “time is on their side” – that the international community, whether the United States or the European Union, will swallow concerns and put aside any questions about the North Korea military connection given their eagerness to offset China’s business and development influence within Myanmar.

Recent history has shown that the United States and indeed the United Nations have failed in stopping North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and missile capabilities. Let us hope that nascent political and economic reforms, as well as near-term opportunities, in Myanmar do not likewise blind the international community of the need to bring accountability and transparency to any North Korean military dealings in and with Myanmar.

Understandably, businesses, development bankers and aid agencies, whether Japanese, European or American, are eager to join what may well be a mad rush into Myanmar in their efforts to gain competitive advantage.

Yet, any such effort that requires looking the other way on human rights violations or sweeping under the carpet any North Korea-Myanmar dealings is neither in the interest of the international community nor of the people of Myanmar or the region in the long-term.

 

Curtis S Chin served as the US ambassador to the Asian Development Bank under presidents Barack Obama and George W Bush (2007-2010) and is managing director of advisory firm RiverPeak Group, LLC.