Duterte’s rainbow cabinet challenges Manila elite

Beneath a barrage of bad press for his outbursts, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has amassed a diverse, pro-business Cabinet as he gets down to the business of governing

Since the election of Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte in a landslide victory on May 9, regional and international media have highlighted his outrageous remarks backing the extra-judicial killings of drug dealers, calling Philippine bishops “sons of whores”, alleging that journalists are killed because they are corrupt and joking that he would have wanted to be first in line when an Australian missionary was raped, then murdered.

To be sure, Duterte as president will be very different from his predecessors. But there is a need for a more layered understanding of the man and his policies.

For one thing, he is the first Philippine president who is not from the traditional land-owning elite, which has dominated the centres of power in the capital Manila since independence. His base is in Davao City in the traditionally neglected southern Philippines. He has said he will stay in Davao, commuting daily by air, until he is comfortable in Manila. To stress this point, he was in Davao when he was officially proclaimed by a joint session of the Philippine Congress on May 30 as the next president.

His election signals a shift away from Manila-centred politics and an effort to reach out to hitherto marginalised sectors of Philippine society. His speeches and public comments are in English rather than Tagalog, the lingua franca of Manila. He has emphasised his links with Mindanao and several of his cabinet appointments hail from the region.

Links to the left

Duterte also draws support from the Philippine left wing and has close ties with the founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) Jose Sison, under whose leadership the CPP waged a Maoist-influenced guerilla insurgency and who has been in exile in the Netherlands since 1987. Duterte has welcomed Sison’s plans to return home.

Negotiations with the CPP since 2011 aimed at ending the insurgency are currently at an impasse, but Duterte is more likely to reach an agreement.

This opening to the left is seen in two of his Cabinet appointments who were nominated by the National Democratic Front, which is allied to the communists. Judy Taguiwalo, a University of the Philippines professor and women’s rights advocate, is the secretary of social welfare and development, while Rafael Mariano is secretary of agrarian reform. 

Pro-business cabinet

These appointments are balanced by pro-business technocratic appointments to key economic portfolios, including secretary of finance Carlos Dominguez, who served in the cabinets of presidents Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos and is a close friend of Duterte from Davao City.

Energy secretary Alfonso Cusi served Aquino as head of the Manila International Airport Authority, the Ports Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority.

Economic planning secretary Ernesto Pernia was lead economist at the Asian Development Bank. Based on Duterte’s effective management in Davao City, economic policy is likely to follow the growth-oriented policies of Aquino with greater emphasis on decentralisation, poverty alleviation and land reform.

Former president Fidel Ramos, who served from 1992 to 1998, was an early supporter of Duterte and has been influential in pushing pragmatic policy choices. Ramos’ influence is positive as his tenure was marked by an economic transformation in the Philippines as well as a significant outreach to the communist and Muslim rebel movements. Ramos appointees now holding Cabinet posts include secretary of labour Silvestre Bello, a Davao human rights lawyer and former justice secretary.

Because of Duterte’s unwillingness to accommodate the preference of the Manila political elite for business as usual, his Cabinet includes more nominees with close personal ties with the president and who hail from Davao and the surrounding Cotabato region. 

Domestic priorities, foreign headaches

Duterte’s priorities are domestic. Law and order, anti-corruption and crushing the drug problem are at the top of his agenda. He aims to devolve power from the central government to the provinces.  He intends to shift to a federal-parliamentary system and the Constitution will have to be revised.

However, such a move will face resistance as Filipino politicians will contend that president Marcos used such a switch from a presidential to a parliamentary system to amass power and dominate Philippine politics.

His appointment of Major-General Delfin Lorenzana as defence secretary reflects a desire to maintain ties with the United States even as the Philippines moves to restore relationship with China. Lorenzana has spent most of the past two decades in Washington as defence attache.

Duterte’s foreign policy is still unclear. Perfecto Yasay, former head of the Securities and Exchange Commission whose roots are in Davao City, is the new foreign secretary. As Yasay is not linked to the pro-American policies of the outgoing administration, a tilt away from the US towards a more even-handed approach is possible.

Given the strong Chinese reaction to the Philippines’ case against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning South China Sea territorial claims, Yasay’s first challenge will be the management of the bilateral relationship with China.

So far, mixed signals have been sent by the new administration. During his election campaign, Duterte called for bilateral talks. Post-election, he proposed a multilateral dialogue involving claimant states as well as other states including the US, Japan and Australia. He has also said that he would not surrender the Philippines’ right to Chinese- occupied Scarborough Shoal. Yasay has said that relations with China should improve as long as China “adheres to the rule of law, respects our territorial integrity and sovereignty”.

Asean is not a focus of Duterte’s attention. 

Leaders at the next Asean Summit in Vientiane in November will have to deal with a disengaged leader unless issues directly concerning the Philippines are on the agenda. One worrying possibility is the revival of the Philippines claim to Sabah, reflecting the influence of Duterte’s power base in Mindanao.

Nevertheless, while Duterte’s priorities may be domestic, international developments may intrude and shape the priorities of his administration.

 

Barry Desker is a distinguished fellow of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.