Pondering future Thai diplomatic strategies

Later this week, all Thai ambassadors stationed abroad will be summoned home to spend a couple of days in a downtown hotel to deliberate on a five-year strategy for the country’s external relations. This is a challenging task, coming one day after the November 8 presidential election in the US.
Indeed, Thailand is going through a tumultuous time. To reposition the country for the next five years (2017-2021), at least a few key broad trends must be discerned related to domestic, regional and international environ?ments.
First of all, there is the state of Thai democracy and viability. Obviously, the kind of liberal democracy we wish for remains inspirational. But Thailand is gradually returning to the system all too familiar after the political changes following 1932.
For good or for bad, there will be a general election and an elected government later next year, according to the roadmap. It is to be hoped that by that time the nature of Thai politics and politicians would be transformed, making the next government more stable, less polarised and accountable with clear national agendas. All stakeholders must be engaged to ensure this is not wishful thinking.
As such, the country will be able to move forward full throttle, pushing for economic growth to the next level in areas of science, technology and innovation. This path would lead Thailand to overcome the middle-income trap in years ahead.
Nearly 30 months after the power seizure, the Prayut administration con?tinues to hold firm over the country’s future direction. All government agencies have been assigned to prepare a comprehensive national strategy for the next 20 years — a rarity in the country’s history. It is a Thai government’s first attempt to contemplate such an ambitious and long-term plan. Previously, numerous strategic plans have been left unimplemented. This time around, the new charter mandates long-term national agenda settings that must be carried out.
Second, from now on, Thailand will face a formidable strategic environment in neighbouring countries with familiar as well as new challenges. Against this dynamic regional backdrop, Thailand hopes to play a crucial role of bridge building, ensuring the region’s peace and prosperity linking less developed neighbours (phaen-baan). Better border management of both land and sea must also be the country’s top priority as Asean is moving toward more integration. Policy-makers must include adjacent neighbours in their strategies in all dimensions.
Ironically, in the current Thai situation, our neighbours no longer perceive the country as facing a political and security threat as in the early 1990s, when the Domino Theory was much in vogue. Positive progress and development in Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos provides Thailand with both opportunities and challenges. Notably, for the first time in 44 years, Thailand and Myanmar have a genuine functional relationship, which will provide the bedrock of stability and prosperity as never before. Their combined land mass comprises half of mainland Southeast Asia.
With its strategic location and well-calibrated outreach programmes, Thailand can connect with all neighbouring countries, both bilaterally and collectively. The connectivity plans within the context of Asean and the Mekong sub-region must be totally embraced and implemented. At the crossroads of East-West – as well as the North-South corridors – Thailand is well placed to synergise all labyrinth infrastructure projects and proposals that may present them-selves. However, without clear policy direction and action plans, outside powers could easily seize the advantage.
To enable seamless connectivity, the Thai economy has to be more open and less bureaucratic. Indeed, the capitalist Thailand, with only six free-trade agreements, can learn a few things from a communist economy like Vietnam, which has signed up a total of 16 free-trade agreements, with seven more in the offing.
Right now, Thailand should be the hub of Asean – if it were not for a few knuckleheads at the Commerce Ministry, Financial Ministry and Immigration Office.  
Thirdly, Thailand’s relations with major powers are robust. So far, it has not alienated allies or friends. As a freedom loving country with a long history of independence, Thailand has learned to survive, even when abandoned by its most trusted friend. Strange but true, at the end of October in responding to meteoric shifts of a regional strategic landscape, Washington has now hailed Bangkok as its “natural ally”. Quite frankly, Thailand is no longer falling for such pleasantries anymore. In the next ten years, it would be extremely unrealistic to keep the 63-year-old Thai-US alliance, especially Cobra Gold, unless there were fresher approaches and assessments of the friendship which began in 1833.
Therefore, in the past two years, Thailand has moved on with healthier and less patronising relations with China, Japan and India. To a lesser degree, Thailand has improved ties with Russia, which will commemorate its 120th anniversary next year. A well-balanced policy approach to the big three Asian powers has already placed Thailand in an enviable position. The country’s main objective is to prevent any hegemonic power dominating the region. It must be emphasised time and again there are no such things as pro-US or pro-China policies—just pro-Thai, so to speak.
With a better appreciation of domestic developments and a display of sensitivities, Australia is gradually replacing the European Union as the top-ranked Western friend. Maritime and cyber security cooperation will be the new benchmark of Thai-Australian cooperation in years to come. Canada remains an underutilised close friend. The latest dramatic shifts in power-plays within the region – due to grow-ing assertiveness and confidence of regional leaders – have added value to the century-old middle-of-the road diplomacy and posturing involving the major powers.
Fourth, Thailand still needs capable human resources and sufficient financial backing to implement the planned five-year strategy.  The country lacks diplomats and officials who can conduct multilateral negotiations in all aspects. Only a few veteran envoys are present in Washington DC, New York, Geneva and the Asean Permanent Representative Office in Jakarta to deal with complicated global and regional issues – such as the refugee crisis, fulfilling UN Sustainable Development Goals, a total ban on nuclear weapons and challenges of the Asean community-building process. In the area of trade, there are no world-class negotiators anymore in Thailand, while Malaysia and Vietnam boast quite a few.
Finally, the biggest asset for Thailand is its people and culture. Therefore, any workable strategy must engage and have these civic elements coupled with public diplomacy. This is by far one of the biggest challenges as some quarters of the Thai community are still stuck with the old paradigm and narratives, with no end in sight.