Lack of spine is crippling the junta in far South

Although the insurgency in the far South was not among the excuses it gave for staging a coup three years ago, the ruling junta knows it cannot afford to ignore this serious security crisis.
Yet Thailand’s top brass have preferred to pass the buck, blaming the previous government of Yingluck Shinawatra for launching a defective peace process that they now have to live with. The junta’s message is that, out of the goodness of their hearts, they are willing to continue down this path despite its shortcomings.
If the previous administration’s initiative was something between a hoax and a leap of blind faith, then the junta’s approach isn’t much better.
Peace talks begun during the Yingluck government were mainly focused on appeasing the public and international opinion. “We have reached out to the Malays of Patani”, was the message “and if they don’t reciprocate, what can Bangkok do?”
If the government had placed national interest ahead its own political interest, then they would have opened talks with the real insurgents – those with command and control over militants.
Instead, Yingluck had her cronies and associates build a process in the hope that the militants behind the violence would eventually come on board.
The Army wasted no time in discrediting the half-baked result, having been left out of proceedings from the outset. They offered up clumsy intelligence, informing foreign embassies that separatist groups at the Malaysia-facilitated talks were targeting Westerners.
Yet the desire that unites all these groups – as well as the excluded Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls virtually all of the separatist militants – is for Western governments to participate in the peace talks, which would legitimise their struggle.
Understandably, the junta now wants to talk to the separatists who actually control the combatants on the ground. It cares little about Patani Malays’ historical grievances, lack of social mobility, discrimination, torture, extra-judicial killings, abduction and the culture of impunity among the security officers dispatched to control the “khaek”, or guests (despite the “khaek” being, in fact, the indigenous population).
The junta even refuses to legitimise the people it is negotiating with by using their official name, MARA Patani – preferring to call them “Party B”.
Over the past two months, Thai security agencies have suffered a spate of attacks. There have also been three bombings in Bangkok in the past two months, and Thai security officials are not ruling out the possible involvement of Patani Malay militants.
There was also the massive car-bomb at a Big C supermarket in Pattani. Given the unprecedented nature of the incident – as Patani Malay militants do not target innocent Muslims – Thai security officials are not ruling out other possibilities.
The attacks have jolted and embarrassed officials in Bangkok. So when the BRN declared last month it would be willing to hold talks, if international representatives were present, many Thai military officials welcomed the suggestion. For once, the people who could influence the militants on the ground would be at the table.
Kuala Lumpur, which has been facilitating these talks since February 2013, is also eager to show progress.
With its declaration, the BRN has handed the government a genuine opening to possible peace. Yet so far the junta hasn’t had the courage or commitment to meet the BRN halfway.
There is a widespread and growing belief that the military wants to keep the southern insurgency alive so that it continues to benefit from the enormous security budget allocated to the region.
Others think the military just lacks the political courage and vision to push for peaceful change, even now that they are in complete control.
But if they really care about people in the region, they should take a deep breath and give it a shot.