Will new election be déjà vu for the Democrats?

Back in 2013, when former Democrat dissident Alongkorn Pollabutr called for reform to his party, the rival Pheu Thai was omnipresent and Suthep Thaugsuban was still playing orthodox politics. Thailand’s oldest political party has come a long way since then, but in the grand scheme things, little appears to have changed.
While Pheu Thai enters a period of soul-searching over its crucial but destructive ties with the Shinawatras, the Democrats face a different kind of headache. They have a better leadership transition structure than Pheu Thai, but the latter keeps on winning elections.
Since Alongkorn’s mini-rebellion, the Democrat Party has lost key members including Suthep to street protests against the Pheu Thai government, boycotted a general election, and found itself – at least, initially – in an ambivalent position regarding the military takeover. But the original problems that sparked Alongkorn’s call for reform will not go away easily. Although most party members will still insist that the anaemic appeal of Thailand’s oldest political camp is mainly a result of the Shinawatras’ formidable “money politics”, many believe there is more to the Democrat Party’s trouble than that.
Incumbent leader Abhisit Vejjajiva has the support of is predecessor Chuan Leekpai. Both see the party as the alternative to an unscrupulous empire that has used “populism” to garner grass-roots support. Together, they have much influence on the thinking of key Democrats. This flies in the face of the opposing school of thought, which wants the party to act more and talk less, and, more importantly, undergo a formal, large-scale and well thought-out process of reform.
When it comes to leadership transition, the Democrat Party possesses some healthy characteristics. It has never been dominated by any individual or clan. The likes of Chuan, Abhisit and Banyat Bantadtan have taken turns at the helm with no serious suggestion that their leadership has been “fake” or by proxy. Local party branches have taken a significant role in determining changes at the top.
In contrast, Pheu Thai and its antecedents have always suffered a democratic deficit in their leadership. Since the days of the now-defunct Thai Rak Thai Party, this political camp has been dominated by Thaksin Shinawatra and his close relatives. Party “leadership” has been practically synonymous with a single extended family.
But this Shinawatra-centric camp has always been extremely successful in winning the hearts of the grass-roots people. While the Abhisit-Chuan school may blame Pheu Thai’s monopoly of northeastern support and financial clout to “buy” support in Parliament, others point out that its policies must also be a factor. Controversial as Pheu Thai policies may have been, their appeal to grass-root Thais are undeniable. More importantly, what Pheu Thai promised in election campaigns was always delivered, albeit often contentiously.
Democrat Party “reform”, if it happens, will feature a fight between the two schools over ends and means of the overhaul. The internal battle lines will divide idealists from more pragmatic members. The Abhisit-Chuan camp warns that if you become your own worst enemy, you will lose your soul. The others argue that it is pointless to resist change necessary if the party wants to be competitive at the polls again.
The situation is complicated enough without the political crisis and the coup. The Pheu Thai Party’s slump is obvious, but it would be a big mistake for the Democrats to use that as an excuse to procrastinate over internal reform. For many, the question now is no longer whether to go ahead, but how.