In the South, four more WASTED YEARS

The junta is mulling the legacy it will leave behind regarding its four years of control over the troubled southern border provinces. The generals might not be going anywhere depending on the outcome of the 2019 election, but they must be concerned that there’s so little to show for yet another block of time that’s passed with no resolution to the insurrectionist problem.
For the Malay-speaking South, the junta’s turn in power has been just more of the same as, and in fact oddly reminiscent of, the days when Yingluck Shinawatra, whom the generals ousted, fumbled though attempts at peace initiatives. Both administrations were cultivating false hope when they knowingly talked to the wrong people to try and persuade the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which has command over the armed militants, to participate in talks about ending the conflict. We now know that the BRN cannot simply be dismissed as stubborn. It has indeed been smart enough to recognise that the Thai authorities’ sole intent was to draw its leaders out in the open and commit them to a process, while their concerns and grievances would continue being ignored. Many would consider the group wise to remain underground, ready to fight on.
The Thai state has not only refused to address the historical grievances of the Malays of Patani, it has failed to indicate any concessions it might be willing to make in the interest of peace. 
It was only seven months after the May 2014 coup that the junta announced it would continue efforts made by the Yingluck government to revive the peace process. It said any discussions would have to include all longstanding Patani separatist groups under one representative umbrella – and the umbrella turned out to be MARA Patani. BRN, declining to participate, could be 
forgiven for taking offence if the Thais regarded all Patani groups as fundamentally the same. It reflects a deep-seated prejudice towards the Malays. 
Before MARA Patani was formed, its future members were rubbing shoulders with foreign NGOs, the King Prachadhipok Institute and Malaysian special branch police, the aim being to enhance their legitimacy and international standing. Today they have nothing to show for such outreach because the people of Patani do not regard them as 
legitimate. Without the BRN, the peace dialogue with MARA Patani was doomed to fail.
Even Thailand’s new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, is now suggesting a change in course and has asked to meet BRN leaders separately. He went as far as ditching the “safety zone” pilot project launched earlier this year, along with its requisite ceasefire, saying he wanted to start again with a clean slate.
If this seems sensible and perhaps cause for optimism, beware that, to observers who monitor the conflict closely, Udomchai sounds like a 
broken record. Every general in charge before him has arrived on the scene with a fresh trick up his sleeve, and they all went home empty-handed. 
The state and the military have always ensured there were wedges dividing civil society organisations, pitting one against another with offers of funding and laughable “information operations”. In fact, Udomchai would be well advised to halt such operations, which aren’t so much counter-intelligence as they are counterproductive, pushing aside people and groups that might be helpful. But perhaps that’s to be left to another government.