'We Watch' petitions EC, calls for accountability

“We Watch” urged the Election Commission (EC) to take responsibility and resign over “errors in managing the 2026 election”, calling on it to clarify every allegation and every step transparently because the public no longer has confidence.

On February 16, 2026, at the Election Commission Office, the We Watch group and civil society representatives submitted a letter to the Election Commission, asking the EC to consider the mistakes and show responsibility for the management of this election, and to use the lessons to improve the next election.

A representative of the group read a statement saying that, although elections are an important political process that reflects the will of the people in a democratic system, this election administration by the Election Commission has shown many errors, abnormalities and problems, seriously contradicting the basic principles of election management. This situation has created widespread doubt and suspicion, leading to movements calling for investigations and recounts in many areas nationwide, and reflecting a crisis of confidence in the current election-management organisation.

From the current situation and all of these errors, the group therefore made the following demands and proposals to the EC:

1. To resolve society’s doubts and suspicions, the EC should fully disclose information for public verification and act immediately by publishing 100% of the official results through the ECT Report system as soon as possible. It should also disclose the polling-unit results summary documents (Form 5/18) as required by regulations as soon as possible. If possible, it should consider disclosing images of the tally boards (Form 5/11) so the public can verify them, including the advance-vote ballot scores for all.

In addition, problems in the management of advance voting ballots must be explained transparently and systematically, including the number of problematic ballots and the nature of the problems, to reduce public doubt.

2. Clarify suspicions in a systematic and transparent way, supported by evidence. Explain every point the public has questioned in detail, in a way that can be verified. In cases where vote totals decrease or data does not match, there must be a clear explanation that is understandable and can be rechecked. In cases where the reporting system malfunctions or the website goes down, there must be a transparent technical explanation in terms of computer systems, disclosing the behind-the-scenes structure of vote reporting—who has the authority to access and edit data, the number of times data was updated, what it was changed from and to, and for what reason—confirming preventive measures so the same kind of incident does not happen again.

For the use of barcode and QR code systems in the election process—given that many members of the public have expressed concerns that barcodes and QR codes could potentially be linked to information enabling voter identification, or could pose risks of personal data leakage, and could affect the principle of secret ballots—so as to protect citizens’ fundamental rights, especially the secrecy of voting, and to build confidence in the overall election system, the Election Commission must clearly and concretely explain to the public the purpose, scope and procedures for using such systems at every level; safeguards to prevent system data from being linked to individuals; the technical and legal mechanisms guaranteeing that secrecy will not be violated; processes for storing, accessing and destroying data; those authorised to access such data; as well as security risk assessments and response measures if a data leak occurs.

3. Recount only the polling units where there are doubts, under legal authority, and disclose it to the public. Use legal authority to order recounts in units or constituencies where there are doubts, to address concerns directly. Opening ballot boxes for recounts must be done in front of the public, observers and the media. The recount should be livestreamed or recorded so it can be reviewed afterwards, clearly showing that ballot boxes were stored and sealed properly, with no contamination or procedural irregularities.

4. Open space for civil society to participate in oversight by bringing civil society and observer networks into the process to enhance credibility and transparency. Carry out every step quickly to prevent the accumulation of doubts in society. The EC must also take a stance that strengthens public confidence in oversight, rather than creating fear around criticism, because raising observations about errors or problems in election management is part of public scrutiny—an important mechanism for strengthening transparency and improving election-management standards to build confidence. Therefore, opening space for scrutiny of election administration is an essential element in a democratic system.

5. The EC must be responsible for public confidence, because the legitimacy of holding office does not depend only on legal legitimacy, but also on the confidence of society, as an election-management organisation that must be based primarily on integrity and impartiality.

Therefore, if all measures cannot restore public confidence, office-holders should seriously consider their responsibility—such as “resignation”—because an independent organisation with the authority to manage elections must show the public that it is sincerely accountable to public confidence.

In addition, to guarantee the legitimacy and credibility of election management processes in the future:

1. There must be reform of how EC members are appointed so the EC is independent, neutral and credible, through a selection process that is transparent and includes participation from experts across diverse fields as well as civil society. Crucially, the selection process and scrutiny process must be genuinely anchored to the people as the owners of sovereignty, in order to create accountability in the performance of EC duties.

2. The role of the EC at the provincial level should be restored, because Thailand has 77 provinces, more than 400 constituencies, and about 99,487 polling units. Centralising the EC’s authority at the national level makes it impossible to resolve problems quickly at the local level.

3. There must be reform of the EC’s powers by reducing excessive authority, because currently, in addition to being an election-management body, the EC also has authority over elections and referendums, authority to issue laws, regulations, orders and announcements, and authority to investigate, conduct inquiries and adjudicate, including suspending or revoking candidates’ rights (yellow card, orange card, black card). This is comparable to the EC holding legislative power, executive power and judicial power within a single organisation.

In addition, the EC has powers that could become a conflict of interest with the Senate, which approves EC appointments. Yet the authority to adjudicate and petition the Supreme Court to investigate wrongdoing by senators appears to rest with the EC as well.

Patsaravalee Thanakitvibulphol, a political activist, said our group has found doubts regarding an election and a referendum vote that were not transparent, and has found many allegations, which the EC must answer—whether this election was correct and transparent, and whether the votes were counted correctly. Every demand reflects the EC’s work. Normally, the EC was not trusted already, and after February 8, confidence dropped even further. Today we have therefore come to demand answers and ask: who will be responsible for what happened if not the EC?